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This thesis takes a multidisciplinary approach to understanding the characteristics of Location
Based Services (LBS) and the protection of location information in these transactions. This
thesis reviews the state of the art and theoretical approaches in Regulations, Geographic Infor-
mation Science, and Computer Science.
Motivated by the importance of location privacy in the current age of mobile devices, this thesis
argues that failure to ensure privacy protection under this context is a violation to human rights
and poses a detriment to the freedom of users as individuals. Since location information has
unique characteristics, existing methods for protecting other type of information are not suit-
able for geographical transactions. This thesis demonstrates methods that safeguard location
information in location based services and that enable geospatial analysis.
Through a taxonomy, the characteristics of LBS and privacy techniques are examined and con-
trasted. Moreover, mechanisms for privacy protection in LBS are presented and the resulting
data is tested with different geospatial analysis tools to verify the possibility of conducting these
analyses even with protected location information.
By discussing the results and conclusions of these studies, this thesis provides an agenda for
the understanding of obfuscated geospatial data usability and the feasibility to implement the
proposed mechanisms in privacy concerning LBS, as well as for releasing crowdsourced geo-
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During the past few decades, the market associated with mobile technology has grown at an
impressive rate, becoming attractive to all actors involved: manufacturers, operators, govern-
ments, and research centres. The massive adoption of this technology, the improved computing
power of new devices, commercialisation opportunities for traditional voice services, now allow
high-level interaction between users and access to information on the Internet. This evolution
of mobile communication has turned cell-phones into the essential way people communicate
daily, and there is an increasing demand for new applications that suit their needs.
Location aware devices such as smartphones, use Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)1
or technologies like WiFi or cell towers to calculate location information. These devices feature
portability, connectivity, processing capability, and a personal use nature; favouring the demand
for context aware services, specifically Location Based Services (LBS). The advantages that
these services provide include tracking goods, enabling requests of points of interest (PoIs),
and shortest path calculation even with multimodal transport, among many others.
LBS are part of Location Based Information Systems (LBIS). Labrador et al. (2010) defines it as
“applications that provide users with information based on their geographical position, which
could be obtained from the mobile device they are accessing the service, or using a manually
defined location”. The origin of LBS dates to the introduction of the E911 (Enhanced 911)
system in the United States in 1996, which required the mobile operators to locate the callers
of the emergency line with prescribed accuracy according to Bellavista et al. (2008). In order
for the LBS to provide the requested information properly, sensitive data about the subject’s
location is required. While this sensitive information is sent from the mobile device and stored
1Like Global Positioning System (GPS), Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou, etc.
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unprotected, it is in danger of being intercepted and misused by untrusted parties and even by
the LBS provider itself.
Location privacy violation can lead to the identification of the victims and their physical sur-
roundings. This breach enables attacks like: stalking, physical assaults, and targeted advertis-
ing, among others. Attacks are not limited to the use of real-time location information of an
individual. Rather, historical records can be used to estimate a user’s routine; revealing where a
person is going to be based on past information. Additionally, location information can expose
personal preferences, there are places where the mere recordings of someone’s permanence
there gives away sensitive information subject to moral discrimination, e.g. hospitals, churches,
political centres, etc.
In some cases, governments may obtain telephone records and location information of persons
involved in judicial acts; however, if this information is accessed unrestrained, it could be used
improperly and put at risk the freedom of citizens. This concern is not oblivious to governments,
which have included lawful protocols to handle the communications of location information as
stated by the European GNSS Agency (2010). At the time of writing, some of the current related
regulations are:
• In the EU, guidelines for public administrations on location privacy by the European
Commission (2016), the Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications
by the EU (2002), and Regulation 2016/679: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
by the EU (2016). These aim to provide european citizens with the right to e-privacy and
specifically to location privacy protection;
• In Colombia, there is the law Ley 1581 by Congreso de Colombia (2012), that mandates
entities that handle personal data to notify their users to what extent their data will be
stored or manipulated; this does not address specific policies for location information;
• In the U.S the Location Privacy Act has been introduced some times in Congress, but not
yet passed, the latest attempt being by Franken (2015).
Privacy is a complex subject. One of the first definitions to this term came earlier on the 19th
century in the U.S by Warren and Brandeis (1890) and is quite simple: “The right to be let
alone”. Brandeis argued that privacy was the most cherished of freedoms in a democracy, and
was concerned that it should be reflected in the Constitution. The connotation of this has evolved
along with communications and technology, making it a day-by-day challenge to maintain the
balance within the developed technology and available privacy measures.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations (1948), Article 12 refers
to the right to privacy: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
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In the U.K, The Human Rights Act of 1998 by the ECHR (1998) further states:
1. “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his corre-
spondence.”
2. “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
These explicit rights aim to preserve privacy, acknowledging the need for such right in a demo-
cratic society and for the best interest of the individual. It is for these reasons that a holistic
approach for information handling in this era is critical to preserve the basic rights that every-
one should be entitled to.
The need for identifying specifically location privacy led to its definition in Perilla et al. (2006)
as: “A special type of information privacy which concerns the claim of individuals to determine
for themselves when, how, and to what extent location information about them is communicated
to others”. This still retains the ideology of Article 12 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights
to avoid arbitrary inferences, but within the more limited frame of location information. This
definition will be characteristic in the followings of this work, since many questions arise from it
on the ‘how-to’ accomplish the aforementioned right to privacy under the location information
frame.
The practical measures to assure this fundamental right are discussed in the first chapters of this
work, reviewing many mechanisms to provide location privacy. Formally, these mechanisms
will be addressed as Location Privacy Protection Mechanisms (LPPMs). The LPPMs available
in the literature are very diverse in their application, this is explained by the broad features
offered by LBS that demand tailored privacy measures. In spite of this, there is a lack of
implementation of LPPMs in commercial applications.
The surplus in LPPMs from the academic community evidences the need for researchers to
work hand in hand with the industry, to develop solutions available to the public in the benefit
of an individual’s right to privacy, as well as to generate confidence in the service providers
for introducing practices on how to handle user’s information with privacy requirements. This
would result in increased transparency and user participation. Xu and Gupta (2009) found that
user’s privacy concerns translate into fear of losing control of personal information, leading to
cause stress and anxiety. With the adoption of privacy protective measures, the perception of
privacy and user’s trust on the providing companies of a service can increase, leading to more
compliance to adopt an LBS.
To provide privacy, it is important to understand the components of the information that requires
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this protection. There are three aspects to location information: identity, location and time.
If an adversary is able to link between them, location privacy is broken. These components
form an instance of location information; a sequence of such instances gives historical location
information, which allows to establish behaviour patterns and the possibility of identifying the
user’s home, work, and routines.
For this work, the Idem Identity or the Diachronic Meaning of Identity is preferred instead of
Ipse Identity2 to explain the identity component of location information. This is expressed by
the following quote of Beller and Leerssen: “Identity becomes to mean being identifiable, and
is closely linked to the idea of permanence through time” found in Rannenberg et al. (2009a).
This notion is relevant in the way that not only the revelation of real world identifiers such as ID
number or name is considered a break in anonymity, but also pseudonymous if correctly linked
can lead to the identification of an individual on a dataset.
There are diverse approaches that have been proposed to satisfy location privacy requirements;
some of them are designed to protect user’s identity while issuing queries, others focus on
protecting the user’s location and some even offer protocols to obfuscate query predicates as
well.
2“The synchronic meaning of identity refers to the ’unique sense of self’ that a person has about his own being”
from (Beller and Leerssen, 2007, p. 4)
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(a) Sample of location information with no alterations
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(b) Sample of location information with no timestamps
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(c) Sample of anonymous location information
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(d) Sample of location information with obfuscated location
Figure 1.1: Behaviour when altering components of location information
Figures 1.1 show how one component can damage the quality of location information, providing
perspective of what would be available under different scenarios. For a no protection scheme,
an attacker would be able to construct the user’s full path as in Figure 1.1a. Now, suppose an
attacker gains access to identity and time but has no clear knowledge of what places the user
visited, since the location component is obfuscated as in Figure 1.1d. In this case, very little can
be inferred given that the context is highly altered and data loses usability; this specific scenario
corresponds to location privacy, the main focus of this work.
Another solution is the implementation of identity privacy or anonymity. In Figure 1.1c, dif-
ferent pathways can be seen, but no information on the identity of the subjects is revealed.
However, travel information alone could serve to infer the identity of the person by matching
records on a phonebook as in the experiments conducted by Krumm (2007).
Figure 1.1b describes the case when location and identity are specified, but the time component
is missing. In this case, the resulting information lacks context and pathways may not be recon-
structed accurately. However, implementing a model in which this occurs is not likely, since
1.2. Thesis Motivation 9
requests and LBS responses might lose relevance if delayed arbitrarily.
Some of the mechanisms designed for location privacy protection are based on location obfusca-
tion, which is explained in Duckham and Kulik (2005) as “the means of deliberately degrading
the quality of information about an individual’s location in order to protect that individual’s
location privacy”. However, there is still an open discussion on how much degradation of the
location information is sufficient for providing location privacy to users. Moreover, if the re-
sulting obfuscated information remains useful to access an LBS, obtain relevant responses, and
enable data analysis. Some of the contributions of this work are based on Location Obfuscation,
this technique will be examined further in Chapter 2.
An ideal approach for location privacy would not only allow the LBS to function as close as
possible as it would under a no privacy scheme, but would also provide statistics on the LBS
users’ behaviour while protecting each user’s location information. There are challenges that
this pose, particularly on how to handle location information; the way it is transferred and stored
is critical against potential attacks. Geospatial analysis is also a key component for the LBS and
data stakeholders in order to ensure improvements to the service as well as for research purposes
e.g. citizen science.
This work will focus on creating LPPMs with location privacy techniques that do not alter the
geographic coordinate structure of location information in order to enable geospatial analysis.
To verify that the proposed LPPMs enable geospatial analysis, common GIS analysis tools are
used under different experimental scenarios to quantify the variations that occur when compared
to a no privacy scheme.
1.2 Thesis Motivation
Geoprivacy are the individual rights to prevent disclosure of the location of
one’s home, workplace, daily activities, or trips. The purpose of protecting geopri-
vacy is to prevent individuals from being identified through locational information.
Kwan et al. (2004)
Location information is an intrinsic attribute to contextual data of users in available services
nowadays. Given that this information reveals sensitive information that leads to a user’s phys-
ical surroundings and everyday routines, it is essential to guarantee location privacy protection.
However, regular privacy protection algorithms for other kind of data are not suitable to main-
tain LBS functionality or to provide the possibility of statistical inferences from spatial data due
to unique characteristics of this kind of information. Consequently, novel implementations are
required to provide geoprivacy, leading to the following question and research objectives that
will shape the contents of this thesis.
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How to provide location privacy with mechanisms that are scalable, efficient, non-intrusive and
with low impact on geospatial analysis?
This will be achieved through the design of LPPMs and by experimenting with different pa-
rameters and datasets to identify the best settings that comply with the stablished requirements,
ultimately creating a family of LPPMs that are suitable for different LBS and their specific
purpose. This thesis is guided by a series of research objectives, namely:
Research Objective 1 Create a taxonomy for LPPMs based on the purpose of LBS;
Research Objective 2 Design LPPMs that are reliable, scalable, efficient, non-intrusive and
that allow geospatial analysis;
Research Objective 3 Asses the impact of LPPMs based on obfuscation and aggregation on
geospatial analysis.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
Taking into account the previously described status of the emerging technologies and the stand-
ing aside measures to provide location privacy on LBS, this thesis aims to provide an under-
standing of the current state of LPPMs, examine mechanisms developed by the author through-
out this work and their specific purposes. For this, a taxonomy of LPPMs is presented, high-
lighting the benefits and drawbacks of geoprivacy protection mechanisms in the literature and
a categorisation of LBS. This understanding is critical to reach a consensus for integrating the
available mechanisms into existing LBS, that should be intrinsically intertwined.
Furthermore, openly released location information through APIs of popular services (e.g., Twit-
ter, Foursquare, etc.), poses an opportunity for researchers to conduct geographical inference
studies. This thesis will explore how LPPMs affect such inferences and propose solutions to
decrease this impact, the proposed solutions attempt to preserve geospatial analysis results ob-
tained using unprotected geographical data, but with obfuscated location information.
A number of papers, book chapters, and a book have been published for the work of this thesis:
Zurbarán, M., Wightman, P., Oxoli, D., Brovelli, M., Iliffe, M., Jimeno, M., & Salazar, A.
NRand-K: Minimizing the Impact of Location Obfuscation in Spatial Analysis. Transactions
in GIS (accepted for publication)
Zurbarán, M., Wightman, P., Paolo, C., Mather, S. V., Kraft, T. J., & Park, B. (2018). PostGIS
Cookbook (Second Edition). PACKT PUBLISHING LIMITED.
Wightman, P., & Zurbarán, M. (2018). An Initial Evaluation of the Impact of Location Obfus-
cation Mechanisms on Geospatial Analysis. In S. V Ukkusuri & C. Yang (Eds.), Transportation
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Analytics in the Era of Big Data (p. 28). Springer International Publishing.
Zurbarán, M., & Wightman, P. (2017). VoKA: Voronoi K-aggregation mechanism for privacy
in location-based information systems. In 2017 International Carnahan Conference on Security
Technology (ICCST) (pp. 1-6). IEEE.
Brovelli, M. A., Minghini, M., Kilsedar, C. E., Zurbarán, M., Aiello, M., & Gianinetto, M.
(2017). Migrate: A foss web mapping application for educating and raising awareness about
migration flows in Europe. In International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing
and Spatial Information Sciences - ISPRS Archives (Vol. 42, pp. 51-55).
Oxoli, D., Prestifilippo, G., Bertocchi, D., & Zurbarán, M. (2017). Enabling spatial autocorre-
lation mapping in QGIS: The hotspot analysis Plugin. Geoingegneria Ambientale E Mineraria,
151(2), 45-50.
Brovelli, M. A., Oxoli, D., & Zurbarán, M. A. (2016). Sensing slow mobility and interesting
locations for lombardy region (Italy): A case study using pointwise geolocated open data. In In-
ternational Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences
- ISPRS Archives (Vol. 41, pp. 603-607).
Zurbarán, M., Avila, K., Wightman, P., & Fernandez, M. (2015). Near-Rand: Noise-based
location obfuscation based on random neighboring points. In IEEE Latin America Transactions
(Vol. 13, pp. 3661-3667).
Wightman, P., Zurbarán, M., & Santander, A. (2014). High variability geographical obfus-
cation for location privacy. In Proceedings - International Carnahan Conference on Security
Technology (pp. 1-6).
Zurbarán, M., Gonzalez, L., Wightman, P., & Labrador, M. (2014). A Survey on Privacy in
Location-Based Services. Ingeniería Y Desarrollo, 32(2), 314-343.
Gonzalez, L., Zurbarán, M., Wightman, P., Jabba, D., Jimeno, M., & Zurek, E. (2013). Sensi-
tivity analysis and countermeasures for transformation-based location obfuscation. In Proceed-
ings - International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (Vol. 2014-Oct).
Wightman, P., Zurbarán, M., Zurek, E., Salazar, A., Jabba, D., & Jimeno, M. (2013). θ -Rand:
Random noise-based location obfuscation based on circle sectors. In ISIEA 2013 - 2013 IEEE
Symposium on Industrial Electronics and Applications.
Wightman, P. M., Zurbarán, M., Rodríguez, M., & Labrador, M. A. (2013). MaPIR: Mapping-
based private information retrieval for location privacy in LBISs. In Proceedings - Conference
on Local Computer Networks, LCN (pp. 964-971).
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1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature, including the different LBS types and characteristics,
leading to a taxonomy.
Chapter 3 presents the mechanisms developed in this work, designed for real-time location
reporting.
Chapter 4 describes the mechanisms developed in this work, designed for the time when the
LBS releases information as open data or to third parties.
Chapter 5 shows an initial analysis on the impact of LPPMs on geospatial analysis, emphasis-
ing on Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA).
Chapter 6 discusses open issues in the research area, like the lack of commercial implementa-
tion and the need for regulations to ensure privacy protection.
Chapter 7 provides concluding remarks and proposes future research directions, against which
work can be evaluated and enhanced.
1) Introduction
LBS Purposes LPPMs for LBS Types
2) Literature Review & LPPMs Taxonomy
3) Real Time LPPMs
5) Geospatial Analysis Impact
7) Conclusions
6) Discussion
4) LPPMs for Location Information Release to Third Parties
Figure 1.2: Thesis Diagram
Figure 1.2 shows the main structure of the thesis.
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1.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has laid the foundations for this thesis by introducing the background and relevance
of this line of research, the motivation of the research and contributions have been stated as well.
The structure of this thesis according to the aforementioned objectives and research question
are illustrated through an overview diagram in Figure 1.2, that follows the details described in
Section 1.4.




This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature, including: a background on geospatial
positioning, the description of the basic architecture of an LBS and their different purposes; the
use of crowdsourcing for the collection of geographic information, emphasising in the distinc-
tion between volunteered and contributed geographic information; and a taxonomy for location
privacy techniques. At last, the chapter concludes with a discussion comparing different pri-
vacy mechanisms and a chapter summary. This lays the ground for understanding the gaps and
existing problems in the field of geoprivacy, giving support to the following chapters and to the
research question.
2.2 Positioning Systems: GPS, A-GPS & WiFi GPS
In order to explore the concept of LBS, it is important to know the technologies that contributed
to its birth; Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) such as the United States Global Po-
sitioning System (GPS), the European Union’s Galileo or the Russian GLONASS are some key
developments that made possible the emergence of LBS, being GPS the most popular nowadays.
Duckham and Kulik (2006) classifies positioning systems into client-based, network-based, and
network-assisted based on the resources involved for calculating the receiver position.
When GPS was first launched in 1978, these systems were not conceived to work indoors or
for civilian purposes. Rather, they were meant for the military; to guide soldiers, sailors or
aircrafts in open field and with a clear view of the sky as stated by the Department Of Defense
(2008). The GPS receivers were designed to calculate their position using the observed Doppler
shift function, the receivers would get the inputs by searching and acquiring the signal for each
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satellite and then decoding the satellite’s data. This process would take a start-up time of 1
minute and then continue to provide continuous positioning according to van Diggelen (2009).
The wait for a first fix is due to the long distance and how weak the signals from the satellites
are at the time they reach the GPS receiver. Autonomous GPS receivers used in actuality have a
median error of 5 m according to the Department Of Defense (2008), while Zandbergen (2009)
argues that this error is of 8 m.
Positioning systems have since been improved by other technologies, bringing in Assisted-GPS
(A-GPS); where cellular towers assist the receiver in the way it looks for signals, the time for
the initial fix would reduce to 1 second as the signals come from a closer source and are not
as weak as the ones from satellites. This scheme that produces stronger signals also helps in
reducing the communications and energy cost for the receiving device, allowing for positioning
calculations in urban infrastructures. The median error is increased, ranging from 20 m outdoor
and 74 m indoor according to Zandbergen (2009), which is higher than dedicated GPS receivers
under ideal outdoor conditions, but this is still acceptable for most LBS application.
In addition to cellular networks, bluetooth and WiFi networks were introduced to improve calcu-
lation times and accuracy of A-GPS, this new method called WiFi GPS or WPS use fingerprints
and signal strength measures from access points to ensure a higher accuracy and promptness for
geo-spatial positioning. Even if no GPS signal is available, location database vendors would still
provide acceptable positioning of 10 to 20 m of accuracy including indoor settings (Skyhook,
Skyhook) thanks to a crowd-sourced database of WiFi hotspots and cell tower locations.
2.3 Location Based Services
As previously mentioned in Section 1.1, LBS are part of LBIS, and form a specific type of
services that differentiate from others in that they use geographic information from users in
order to provide their functionalities. KuÌĹpper (2005) complies with this definition citing the
GSM Consortium stating that “LBS use the location of the target for adding value to the service,
where the target is the ‘entity’ to be located (and this entity is not necessarily also the user of
the service).” Furthermore, he also proposes a general characterisation of actors involved in
LBS by discriminating by operational and non-operational roles.
In the following subsections, LBS architecture and a classification of the different types will be
examined, further on, a discussion on privacy techniques.
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2.3.1 LBS Architecture
The communication architecture for an LBS involves basic components as shown in Figure 2.1.
The steps an LBS follows to provide its functionality are:
1. The target –or namely, the user– uses her mobile device’s GPS receiver that calculates its
position from satellites, cellular towers and access point signals;
2. The target accesses the cloud through Wi-Fi or a mobile network operator (MNO) to use
the LBS through a web or a native mobile application;
3. The user’s device sends its position while making a request to the LBS provider;
4. LBS processes the request with the received position, during this process, the LBS may
use a Geographic Information System (GIS) with a database that provides the necessary
content in order to send a response to the user;
5. The target’s device receives the response and displays it in the application.
Figure 2.1: Architecture of an LBS
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2.3.2 Types of LBS
LBS serve for many purposes: traffic navigation, tracking of goods, social networks, among
many others. From a location reporting viewpoint, there is however a differentiation that helps
in their study: LBS can require continuous or discrete location reporting according to the offered
functionalities. Continued reporting is understood in the frame of coordinates seconds apart
from each other, producing trajectories of the subject, while discrete reporting occurs every
once in a while and only when the user queries the service, producing a more spread distribution
of the collected location information and not a trajectory. This classification is useful to discern
specific privacy requirements for the type of LBS, this differentiation has been used as well in
(Seidl et al., 2015) and further explained in (Labrador et al., 2010).
2.3.3 Continuous Location Reporting or Proactive Applications
Continuous reporting or ‘proactive applications’ (Labrador et al., 2010), are the ones that re-
quire intensive location reports from the user’s side. They usually provide real time information
with a prescribed accuracy according to a predefined set of conditions. Hence, there is a need
to use the most up to date information from the user when these conditions are met. Examples
for such applications are friend proximity alerts, traffic navigation, or the use of geofencing, i.e.
monitoring users within a predefined boundary. In this kind of services, the actors that take part
and their roles are identified as follows:
1. Monitoring User is the LBS user that requires to trace locations of a tracked device; many
monitoring users could track one device;
2. Tracked device is the one that is constantly reporting its location to the LBS to be observed
by approved monitoring users;
3. Server is what provides a platform for communicating between users and tracked devices,
also stores logs and historical traces and provides content related to the offered service.
2.3.4 Discrete Location Reporting or Reactive Applications
These LBS applications act upon user’s request: the user sends a query containing their spatial
location and asks for information that depends on their geographic context. The LBS processes
this request and sends a response that satisfies the query. A common application of this kind of
application is nearest-neighbor (NN) search, in this case the user “searches for data objects that
minimize a distance-based function with reference to one or more query objects (Khoshgozaran
and Shahabi, 2007); when the user specifies or is able to retrieve more than one neighbour, then
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it is referred as k-nearest-neighbour (KNN) search. Unlike proactive services, these applica-
tions are of the request/response type as mentioned in (Labrador et al., 2010). Some examples
of this type of LBS applications are NN searches, consulting local news, requesting a trans-
portation service, among others. The identified actors for reactive applications are:
1. Requesting User is the one who issues the request based on their current location calcu-
lated by their mobile device;
2. Server; as in the proactive scheme, provides the platform for communicating with users
and serves as a geospatial database to fulfil user’s requests;
3. Predicate of the request, which contains specifications to delimit the server response to
match the user’s needs. This predicate may be in the form of a category for PoIs, time
frames for consulted information or a delimited geographic area. The use of predicates
was introduced by Lu and Jensen (2008).
2.4 Crowdsourced Spatial Data Collection
There are two approaches for collecting crowdsourced geographic information, the differen-
tiation is based on the awareness that the providers of the collected data may have about the
purposes of the provided information. In this way, geographic information can be: ‘Volunteer
Geographic Information’ (VGI) or ‘Contributed Geographic Information’ (CGI), both methods
involve laymen or amateur users in the collection of spatial data and form a rich volume of the
available geographic data, specifically the kind of data that this work aims to protect.
Harvey (2013) stresses the distinction between volunteered and contributed geographic data,
stating that where they differ is in the kind of agreement under which the collection happens.
The user agreements can be opt-in or opt-out: the first one allows volunteered or active partici-
pation, where the user has control over the collected data and over data reuse, while the second
one is contributed or passive participation and the user does not have enough control, if any,
over the frequency and amount of data collected or to what happens to the data after collection.
On the uses of crowdsourced spatial data, Harvey (2013) affirms that "crowdsourced geographic
information already can play an important role in the ability of companies and government
agencies to know and predict people’s activities"1. Goodchild (2007) explains the risks and
opportunities that abound in geographic information generated by amateurs and how it impacts
cartography nowadays.
Harvey (2013) establishes differences between CGI and VGI in his work. He also acknowledges
that data collected as VGI may be reused as CGI. This situation is depicted in the following
example: “when access and reuse are controlled by the person, but the company operating the
1(Chapter. 3 Harvey, 2013, p. 33)
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site uses geographic information about the location to profile users and sell aggregated data
to mobile advertisers” 2. This is not uncommon in search engines or social media platforms,
where the user’s data is in many cases reused to conduct statistical analyses to target audience
with specific promotions relevant to their context and spatial surroundings. In other words,
this is referred as ‘location analytics’ and according to a study by Google (2014) “four in five
consumers want search ads to be customised to their city, zip code or immediate surroundings”.
This provides a profitable ground for indiscriminate location data collection.
The possibilities of VGI took researchers focus to “understanding its characteristics, discussing
approaches of data collection, presentation, validation, and community building with reference
to VGI supporting environmental monitoring”, as well as for “investigating the characteristics
of VGI stakeholders”3.
There are successful experiences made possible by the use of VGI, some of them include re-
sponse for disaster relief, like the case of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, In (Koukoletsos, 2012,
Chapter 7), the author examines the geospatial quality of the contributions of crowdsourced
data for this disaster; finding that when compared to other data sources, such as those from
the UN Stabilisation Mission for Haiti (“MINUSTAH”) and from Google Map Maker (GMM),
OpenStreetMap (OSM) was the richest dataset. Koukoletsos (2012) also concludes that in gen-
eral, crowdsourced data is more up to date than authoritative data.
With the Volunteered Geographic Information (VGI) model, services have been created by us-
ing spatial information from conscious users, this information may be the user’s geographic
knowledge or geographic location reports, that are then made publicly available through the
service to provide a specific functionality. Whether this information is obtained from volun-
teers, should not imply a resignation to a minimum privacy level. It can be argued that VGI
systems could benefit from attracting privacy concerned users (or volunteers) by implementing
protection mechanisms as mentioned by Xu and Gupta (2009).
2.5 Privacy Techniques in LBS
Privacy in location based services focuses on reaching a desirable trade-off between perfor-
mance and user’s privacy; the more privacy provided, less likely it is for the service to function
as proper as it would without any privacy protection considerations. Privacy techniques should
adjust to enable the existing features in LBS; however, the provided features are evolving con-
tinuously. LBS change in order to keep a balance between: meeting users’ requirements, using
the latest technology, and maximising the application lifetime value. This poses a challenge for
creating fitting LPPMs that are reliable, efficient, scalable, and non-intrusive.
2Found in (Chapter. 3 Harvey, 2013, p. 34)
3(Chapter. 2 Iliffe, 2017, p. 22)
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When applied to proactive services, LPPMs ought to keep location information about the tracked
devices undecipherable to anyone different from the allowed monitoring users, even to the LBS
itself; due to the privacy breach this implies for a user considering data reusability by the service
providers. Generally, proactive services require a high level of accuracy on the tracked subject’s
location, relying mostly on how good is the approximation of the positioning system. The chal-
lenge for LPPMs intended for proactive applications is to maintain the level of accuracy that the
positioning component in the device can deliver, while assuring that the location information
provided does not get disclosed. On the other hand, mechanisms intended for reactive services
often do not require critical accuracy, and therefore it is tolerable to alter the subject’s position
in order to provide location privacy; however, it is not a straightforward task to determine how
much alteration is enough or too litle for every service.
Among the existing LPPMs, some require special implementation on the server side architecture
or database structure, in some cases even requiring intermediaries, such as third parties or the
use of proxies. Other alterations of the basic LBS architecture presented in Figure 2.1, include
a peer to peer approach between LBS users, namely the community, to cooperate in order to
mask their location. In Figure 2.2 are depicted different schemes that will be found in proposed
mechanisms included in this review.
The additional actors present in Figure 2.2 that are introduced for privacy protection and were
not previously described in section 2.3.1 LBS Architecture are defined as follows:
1. Community includes all the users of the LBS that may intervene in the functionality of
the service, such is the case of applications used to monitor traffic or location-based so-
cial networks. Community members could participate in methods for providing location
privacy as well.
2. Proxy is a service that provides security at network level to protect user’s communica-
tions. These services could be distributed such as The Onion Router (TOR) (The Tor
Project, 2016) or centralised like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).
3. Third party is an external relation that intervenes to provide location privacy in conjunc-
tion with the LPPM. Third parties relations act as proxy-like servers at application level
that centralises the architecture, Rannenberg et al. (2009b) defines it as: “A subjective, dy-
namic, context-dependent, non-transitive, non-reflexive, non-monotone, and non-additive
relation between a trustor and a trustee”.
Pragmatically, an architecture scheme that does not modifies the existing model of the LBS
is desirable; for example, in Figure 2.2, A represents the straightforward approach, while C
presents a more complex and expensive alternative in terms of infrastructure, communication
and energy consumption. In general, a simpler model should be more convenient while assess-
ing LPPMs; in this work modifications required by an LPPM in infrastructure are considered a
drawback for potential adoption by service providers.
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Figure 2.2: Architecture schemes for LPPMs
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Figure 2.3: Privacy techniques for LBS
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In the literature, there are many techniques for preserving location privacy, the techniques ex-
plored in this work include:








• Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
A Location Privacy technique is a general approach that LPPMs use in order to achieve location
privacy, some LPPMs may use a combination of privacy techniques in their configuration. In
order to study the existing techniques, a taxonomy was designed based on the types of LBS
and their purpose as described in Section 2.3.2. The diagram in Figure 2.3 shows techniques
that are suitable for continuous, reactive or both kinds of LBS. This diagram serves to guide
in identifying among the broad spectrum of LPPMs available, each technique will be presented
with mechanisms that use in this review to assess the state of the art in privacy mechanisms
using a fit for purpose approach to classify them.
2.5.1 LPPMs for All Purpose
2.5.1.1 Spatial Cloaking & K-Anonymity
This category encompasses mechanisms that aim to anonymise the reported location of an LBS
user among other k-1 users. In this technique, it is usually required a trusted third party for
anonymising or a decentralised architecture (P2P), where the community share their location
between them before issuing queries. The anonymiser, either centralised or through the commu-
nity, is assumed to know the location of all users. According to Gong et al. (2010), k-anonymity
algorithms work as follows: a user sends its location, query and a k value to the anonymiser.
The anonymiser removes the ID of the user, then cloaks the user location including at least
k-1 other users. The cloaked region is sent with the query to the LBS sever, which calculates
the candidate results and sends them back to the anonymizer. Kalnis et al. (2007) refer to this
cloaked region as k-anonymising spatial region (K-ASR). Finally, the anonymiser calculates the
actual results for the exact user location and sends them to the issuing user. It is worth noting in
these techniques that spatial density impacts the K-ASR. Regions with higher density of users,
result in smaller K-ASR, whereas regions with low population may require larger K-ASR. Both
extremes derive in providing little protection.
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It has been argued that k-anonymity in relational databases for a high-dimensional relation
of any kind of data leads to unacceptable information loss due to the ‘dimensionality curse’
Aggarwal (2005).
Algorithms used for spatial cloaking are often based in k-anonymity for calculating cloaked
regions. Spatial Cloaking is where “an individual’s device or a third party cloaks the individ-
ual’s location before giving it to the provider of a location-based service” 4. Chow et al. (2009)
propose the Casper query processing framework, that enables the use of cloaking regions for
querying public (restaurants, gas stations, etc.) and private (nearby friends) location informa-
tion. This mechanism requires an anonymising third party and can be used for proactive or
reactive LBS.
Kalnis et al. (2007) present Nearest Neighbour Cloak based on quadtrees to map the query
space and the Hilbert Cloak, which uses Hilbert Curves to cloak location information. The user
locations are mapped into a Hilbert Curve and split into k-sized blocks or ‘k-buckets’, these
blocks are then used instead of single locations to guarantee k-anonymity.
Cheng et al. (2006) present a cloaking approach based on probability, this mechanism does
not employ k-anonymity, it rather uses uncertainty regions to produce an imprecise location.
The authors do not specify a geometry type for the uncertainty regions, but it must be a closed
polygon. The LBS has to implement a way for interpreting the imprecise queries.
Monreale et al. (2013) aim to provide differential privacy, which is a strong privacy model in-
dependent from the knowledge an adversary may have. For this, they propose the use of gener-
alisation and aggregation over trajectory data based on space partitioning. After generalisation,
the user issues the protected location information. For aggregating the trajectory data, Mon-
reale et al. (2013) argue that “administrative districts or regular grids, do not reflect the spatial
distribution of the data”. Consequently, the use of historical data is proposed to identify spatial
clusters to generate a Voronoi tessellation of the territory. For estimating the provided privacy,
they introduce a utility evaluation where the error induced with the spatial transformations is
analytically measured and compared in different experiments.
2.5.1.2 Location Obfuscation
This category includes methods that expand the LBS’s assumption about the actual query loca-
tion to a wider sub space of the spatial domain, called obfuscation region. Location obfuscation
is a technique to provide privacy that, according to (Duckham and Kulik, 2005, p. 155), is de-
fined as “the means of deliberately degrading the quality of information about an individual’s
location in order to protect that individual’s location privacy”.
4(Zhong et al., 2007, p. 2)
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Geographical masking or simply masking was first coined by Armstrong et al. (1999). Masking
was initially designed for geographic health data, because of the critical impact of disclosure.
In their words: “The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to describe and evaluate alternative
approaches to encoding the geography of health records which we call geographic masking that
protect the confidentiality of individuals but which also ensure the possibility of valid geograph-
ical analyses of the data”(Armstrong et al., 1999, p. 498). Even though these terms come from
different areas of research, they both share similarities and are often used interchangeably. For
this work, location obfuscation will be preferred.
Noise-based location obfuscation mechanisms have very little requirements for their imple-
mentation; these involve minimal or no alteration on the LBS architecture while preserving a
geographic coordinates’ data structure, which is critical for geospatial analysis.
Ardagna et al. (2007) refer to ‘relevance’ as a measurement of the provided privacy by location
obfuscation. This is achieved by enlarging the inaccuracy of the already inaccurate reported lo-
cation provided by the MNO. In another work, Ardagna et al. (2011) present various obfuscation
operators that serve to decrease location accuracy while still providing coordinates information.
These operators are inaccuracy, which concerns a lack of correspondence between informa-
tion and reality; imprecision which is a lack of specificity in information; and vagueness, that
concerns the existence of boundary cases in information.
As it happens with other techniques, there is still an open discussion with noise-based location
obfuscation on how much degradation of the location information is sufficient for providing
location privacy to users. Seidl et al. (2015) use maximum noise thresholds of 30, 50, and 250m;
Kwan et al. (2004) experimented with 1032m; and Krumm (2007) demonstrates how inferences
can still be made with an induced noise of 1000m, but are less likely than when 500m is used.
This suggest that there is no magic number for this value. Rather, the induced obfuscation
depends on the LBS application requirements: 500m of data distortion in an accuracy critical
application like Waze would be impossible to deal with, while an app for finding a drugstore,
e.g., yellowpages, could manage to function with 200m of accuracy loss.
Location obfuscation is not a robust way to ensure privacy protection because these mechanisms
still reveal the whereabouts of the user. However, obfuscation does provide a lightweight, de-
centralised, non-reversible and customisable alternative to hide the exact location of the user,
while still being able to access the service.
Wightman et al. (2011) present the N-Rand algorithm, consisting on the generation of N uni-
formly distributed random points within a circular domain centred on the original coordinates.
The farthest generated point from the original location is then reported to the service.
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2.5.2 LPPMs for Proactive LBS
2.5.2.1 Pseudonyms
Pseudonyms are an alternative to provide identity privacy in location based services; however,
the use of pseudonyms alone is not sufficient to provide location privacy in a LPPM, given that
if a pseudonym stays the same over time, it will eventually lead to the identification of the user.
Krumm (2007) shows that phone book inference attacks are possible from location records if
the location is not altered sufficiently, location information itself can be linked to other data for
the identification of subjects.
A Mix Zones method is presented by Beresford and Stajano (2004), where users are given
pseudonyms that serve to communicate with the LBS, but these pseudonyms are changed every
time a user enters a mix zone. This is a zone where users cannot be tracked and swapping
pseudonyms can safely occur, providing periods of anonymity so the server cannot build usable
traces for each user. In order to control the registry of mix zones, a trusted middleware or third
party is required to handle communications between users and the LBS.
2.5.2.2 Cryptography-based
Common offered functionalities in LBS involve geofencing, friend finder applications are an
example of this; monitoring targets within a delimited boundary. Location privacy for these
kind of services should aim to protect the target’s location from the LBS and alert only the
monitoring users when pertinent (i.e., when the target is within the specified boundaries). Zhong
et al. (2007) propose three LPPMs named: Louis, Lester and Pierre for solving the nearby-
friend problem with privacy concerns. For this, the author consider a privacy scenario as “an
instance of a secure multiparty computation problem, where multiple parties jointly compute
the output of a function without learning each other’s inputs”. The proposed mechanisms
fit in the cryptography-based technique by using homomorphic encryption, which Micciancio
(2010) defines as “a special kind of encryption that allows operating on cypher-texts without
decrypting them; in fact, without even knowing the decryption key”. Among these LPPMs, the
Louis protocol requires a semi-trusted third party; however this one does not learn any location
information from targets. In the Lester protocol is not necessary to include a third party, but has
the drawback that a user might be able to learn a friend’s location even if the friend is in an area
that is no longer considered nearby. The Pierre protocol, being the most privacy preserving,
does not have the disadvantage of Lester, but is not able to tell the user the precise distance to a
nearby friend.
Mascetti et al. (2011) focus on friend finder applications as well and define a privacy scheme
where the service provider should have as little information as possible and the user’s friends
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should know the proximity but not the exact position, besides, any eavesdropper in the network
should not be able to filter any location information about the users. To accomplish this, it
is used a ‘Minimal Uncertainty Region’ (MUR) where “the user accepts that the adversary
knows she/he is located in a MUR R, but no information should be disclosed about her position
within R”. The concept of MUR is comparable to that of relevance for location obfuscation by
Ardagna et al. (2007).
In order to obtain these uncertainty regions, they use spatial granularity, which is understood in
many LPPMs as “a subdivision of the spatial domain into a discrete number of non-overlapping
regions, called granules” (Mascetti et al., 2011). The two protocols presented are C-Hide &
Seek and C-Hide & Hash, both adopt symmetric encryption techniques where each user poses
a unique key that is shared with their friends and vice versa. The key exchange is performed
through a secure communication before executing the protocols. In this scheme each user has to
report their location to the service provider, this is done by discretising time in update intervals.
The success of these protocols lies in the fact that for every update of a user, a different key is
used. This is possible due to the generation of a ‘keystream’ based on the initially exchanged
key; each buddy will be able to generate the key corresponding to the current update interval of
their approved buddies and therefore decrypt the identification of the granule where the user is
located. The protocols C-Hide & Seek and C-Hide & Hash differ in the provided privacy. The
first one lets the buddies know the granule where the user is located, while the second manages
to provide full privacy without disclosing the granule unless the buddies are in proximity. C-
Hide & Hash use more computational resources than C-Hide & Seek.
2.5.2.3 Spatial Transformation
Wightman et al. (2012) use homomorphic encryption for proactive LBS in the Matlock mecha-
nism, which is based on a matrix obfuscation technique, where an array M(1,3) is used, contain-
ing latitude, longitude and the time when the coordinates were obtained. An additional squared
N(3,3) array is required to perform the obfuscation operations, this is, multiplying the array M
by N; N could be arbitrarily generated with the only restriction that it must be invertible. The
resulting array Q(1,3) contains the location information encrypted and undecipherable to anyone
without knowledge of N, the key. In order to decrypt the information, the inverse of the N matrix
(N−1) is multiplied by Q, resulting in the original M array with the location information; N is
used as shared key between the monitoring users and target devices, using a secure protocol for
exchanging it. Each user has one N matrix key for all reported locations. The method allows to
recover the unaltered reported position, while providing location information for the LBS. Mat-
lock can be used for most proactive applications. This mechanism uses key exchange, which is
typical of cryptography-based mechanisms, but also transforms the space and is able to perform
proximity operations even with this alteration. In this way, both techniques, cryptography and
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spatial transformation are used to achieve geoprivacy.
Figure 2.4: Original path vs the Matlock transformation 5
2.5.3 LPPMs for Reactive LBS
2.5.3.1 Progressive Retrieval
Methods based on Progressive Retrieval (PR) perform many requests for a single user interac-
tion, these methods use ‘Incremental Nearest Neighbour’ queries (INN) presented in Hjalta-
son and Samet (1999). This technique aims to reveal as least location information as possible
to obtain the desired service. A PR mechanism is presented by Huang et al. (2008) named
SpaceTwist, this mechanism has been modified into other versions to introduce privacy im-
provements; AnonTwist by Wang and Wang (2009), ASkNNA by Gong et al. (2010) and PuP-
PeT by Riboni et al. (2011). All algorithms based on SpaceTwist use an ‘anchor’, which is a
fake location that is contained within a circular area of radius P from the original location; a
‘demand space’, which is centred in the original location and serves to evaluate if a PoI is near
5Taken from (Wightman et al., 2012, p. 1832) with permissions from the authors.
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enough to be considered as relevant; and a ‘supply space’, which initially is just the anchor, but
then increases the circular region the nearest PoI retrieved in each iteration. The SpaceTwist
algorithm finishes when the demand space is fully contained within the supply space, guaran-
teeing that the nearest PoI for the real location is available to the client without revealing the
exact location to the server.
Gong et al. (2010) introduces cloaking algorithms to determine a k-anonymous anchor, while
AnonTwist (Wang and Wang, 2009) uses density maps avoiding the need for a trusted third
party for anonymising. Further on Riboni et al. (2011) present an added privacy feature to
AnonTwist by guaranteeing ‘absence privacy’ as well; this is defined as allowing the user to
specify a ‘puppet location’ where she does not want an attacker to infer that she is not present,
i.e., avoid disclosing when the target is not at home. In order to do so, there is a constrain
that makes the maximum distance between a puppet location and the user’s real location to be
half the initial radius, this is P/2. With a puppet location already specified, the algorithm keeps
requesting PoIs until the puppet location is contained within the candidate area, at the cost of
making this technique less efficient.
2.5.3.2 Temporal Cloaking
Gruteser and Grunwald (2003) developed a temporal cloaking approach, arguing that temporal
resolution of location information can be reduced to guarantee k-anonymity. The authors use
the U.S geological survey (USGS) to create automotive traffic simulation since no testbed was
available when the mechanism was introduced. The authors conclude that an accuracy compa-
rable to that of E-911 requirements could be provided and improved with temporal cloaking,
ranging from 30 to 250 m of median accuracy. This mechanism is not suitable however, for in-
teractive or proactive applications due to the increase in waiting time to guarantee k-anonymity.
2.5.3.3 Dummy Queries
The use of dummy queries is a popular approach to provide location privacy in PoI search
services or NN searches, it consists on sending n fake requests along with the real one in order
to disguise the user’s true location, this technique poses downsides as it requires the server
to process n-1 additional queries to the one relevant to the user, this incurs in computation
overhead and communication costs, however there are some techniques developed based on
dummy queries that manage to decrease such costs.
Kido et al. (2005) developed the first mechanism based on dummy queries, this first approach
proposes the generation of n-1 fake locations to be sent to an LBS to provide location privacy.
The scheme assumes users that are constantly reporting its location to an LBS and therefore
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would not be located too distant from the immediately previous reported location. The dummy
locations are generated in a way that form feasible traces of a regular user; for a first query of a
user, there are generated n-1 random fake location and sent to the LBS along with the real one;
for the following requests, the method bases the generation of dummies in the ones previously
reported in order to build n possible traces for that user.
Quercia et al. (2011) introduces the SpotME mechanism, that aims to work with a large scale
amount of users to count people in certain areas in order to provide information related to traffic,
crowd analysis, and other crowd-sensing applications. SpotME requires the geographical space
to be divided in discrete locations, these locations are then chosen to say whether or not a user is
present in such location, each statement with 50% of probability and the users are not forced to
answer truthfully, hence producing sometimes dummy reports. This data is later manipulated by
an algorithm that estimates the real proportions of all the data received by the LBS, showing an
accurate result of people concentration at certain locations without identifying between users.
SpotME is also able to indicate if people are entering or exiting a location, which results useful
to estimate population flows. The vulnerability of this mechanism resides in the ability of an
attacker to collect more than one map of the location sent by a user and while comparing and
intersecting these maps it is possible to reveal location information and break anonymity.
Lu and Jensen (2008) propose two techniques to generate dummy requests. Both techniques
send a single message to the service, producing lower communication costs in the request than
in previous mechanisms; however it requires a light transformation on the server side for pro-
cessing the requests. The requests are formed by n positions and a type of interest or predicate.
The first proposed mechanism generates a grid of dummies with a dummy position on each
vertex, while the second one generates the dummies based on a virtual circle that contains the
user’s real location. After receiving the request, the server processes all the locations with the
same predicate and retrieves the responses for each location, this is later filtered by the client
leaving only the pertinent results for the real user location.
2.5.3.4 Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
Private Information Retrieval is a widely used approach for providing Location Privacy on NN
searches, formally, it was first defined by Chor et al. (1998) as “schemes that enable a user
to access k replicated copies of a database with k≥2 and privately retrieve information stored
in the database. This means that each individual database gets no information on the identity
of the item retrieved by the user”, but this approach was not initially intended to be used on a
single database, it required replication on at least two databases with communication restriction
between them, since it aimed to provide information theoretic privacy, which demands an ad-
versary with no knowledge of the information requested and assumes unlimited computational
resources for the attacks. It was not until 1997 when Kushilevitz et al. (1997); Chor and Gilboa
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(1997) presented a computational PIR (cPIR) technique with a single database, this scheme as-
sumes an attacker limited to probabilistic polynomial-time computations. PIR techniques are
challenged to provide solutions with reasonable computation and communication costs since
these implementations usually require special processing in the server side of the LBS.
Khoshgozaran and Shahabi (2007) proposed a one-way transformation for the 2-D space, being
able to blindly evaluate, or in other terms privately retrieve results for KNN queries with a
complexity of O(K). For this, they use space filling curves, more specifically, Hilbert Curve that
pose the property of keeping the proximity and neighbouring aspects of the data, in this way
this mechanism uses spatial transformation for PIR of location information. For processing the
queries, the authors propose tamper-proof devices and a trusted third party in the architecture
to distribute Space Decryption Keys (SDK); these keys are composed by the Hilbert Curve
construction parameters, hence serving to decrypt the retrieved results.The privacy scheme the
authors use to evaluate the proposed mechanism introduces the concepts of u-anonymity; the
issuing user is indistinguishable of any other user, a-anonymity; the location of the query point
is not revealed, and result set anonymity; the retrieved PoIs are secret to the LBS. Under this
scheme, a KNN query is blindly evaluated if the three constraints are satisfied.
Ghinita et al. (2008) presents PIR methods with reasonable computation and communication
costs, AproxNN uses Khoshgozaran and Shahabi (2007) Hilbert Curve transformation to repre-
sent PoIs in a 1-D space. The PoIs are queried by the user and an approximate nearest neighbour
is retrieved using binary search. For the query processing, it uses a B+ tree that contains the PoIs
in ascending order; with this approach it is not required a trusted third party and provides cPIR.
In this work is also introduced ExactNN, a mechanism that maps PoIs using a voronoi tessella-
tion in a way that each voronoi cell contains exactly one PoI, a regular granularity squared grid
is superposed and is privately queried by the user retrieving the PoIs contained in the voronoi
cells that intersect the grid cell. For grid cells that are fully contained within a voronoi cell, it
generates fake PoIs to match the number of bytes retrieved by cells with maximum intersected
voronoi cells. This approach guarantees that the nearest neighbour is retrieved, however neither
of the presented mechanism allows for KNN queries, rather a single relevant PoI is retrieved.
Olumofin et al. (2010) present a cryptography-based cPIR protocol designed to be used with
any PIR technique according to the authors. This method adds spatial cloaking to reduce the
database domain to be searched. The protocol consists on discretising the space in the form of
a space granularity based on a Hilbert curve of the concentration of PoIs in an area, this is done
in a way that each resulting granule will contain the same amount of PoIs. The number of PoIs
is specified at setup and cannot be changed later without altering the database. The biggest area
granule resulting from the calculation is set as the size of a cloaking region, a user can chose
a bigger region consisting of more than one cell, which is later consulted with the chosen PIR
mechanism to retrieve only the PoIs in the user Hilbert Cell. Olumofin et al. (2010) argues that
this mechanism differs from AproxNN presented by Ghinita et al. (2008), in that this approach
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is specifically based on the 1997 computational PIR scheme by Kushilevitz et al. (1997).
Khoshgozaran et al. (2008) distinguish between cryptography-based and hardware-based PIR,
where the first one utilises cryptographic transformation for the query and/or database structure,
while the second requires special hardware architecture with a Secure Coprocessor (SC), that
acts as a securely protected space where the retrieval of information takes places in a way that
the LBS cannot decipher; the SC can be seen as a ‘black box’ third party that is embedded into
the LBS server. The SPIRAL mechanism by Khoshgozaran et al. (2008) is hardware-based and
uses random permutation of the database items with a mapping that is only stored in the SC, the
SC also caches the items retrieved to a user to ensure that each item in the database is queried
at most once and to avoid inferences from attackers or the LBS itself; when the cache in the SC
becomes full a reshuffling of the entire database is performed, for this, they propose to generate
offline reshuffled databases to avoid increasing computational costs, a downside of this method
is that it does not support KNN search, but rather retrieves the ith item requested by users.
Papadopoulos et al. (2010) propose a more specific classification for PIR mechanisms than that
of Khoshgozaran et al. (2008), stating that “they can be grouped into: information theoretic,
computational and secure hardware.” In their work is presented a hardware-based PIR which
the authors call the AHG mechanism for KNN queries that aims to provide ‘strong location
privacy’, where “an adversary cannot distinguish the query location from any other location
in the data space”. Referring to a previously introduced concept, this aim translates into pro-
viding location privacy with a MUR of the entire spatial domain. For the AHG mechanism an
architecture with m databases is proposed, where m≥1; this set of disjoint databases containing
fixed-sized blocks, where each block is privately queried by the client using the hardware PIR
protocol of Williams and Sion (2008); this architecture scheme echoes what Khoshgozaran et al.
(2011) present as ‘index structures’ for efficiently scanning a subset of records of an otherwise
large and with prohibitive processing times database. The AHG approach ensures a processing
time of 1 second even for large databases. For processing the private retrieval this mecha-
nisms uses a superposed Hilbert Curve grid Gh (as originally introduced by Khoshgozaran and
Shahabi (2007)) over a regular granularity grid G, so that each cell in G is mapped to a unique
Hilbert value. Papadopoulos et al. (2010) argue that the mechanism presented by Khoshgozaran
et al. (2011) guarantees that each query retrieval is completely private; however, the cardinality
of the PIR requests per KNN queries may reveal information violating the scheme of strong
location privacy.
2.5.3.5 Comparison of LPPMs
Kounadi and Leitner (2015) propose a comparison table, which categorises ‘geographical masks’
under groups, providing definitions for these categories and a masking degree that can be con-
stant or variable. Zurbarán et al. (2014) proposes a comparison of mechanisms from various
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techniques included in this review.
For this thesis, the following table will serve to compare the presented LPPMs within the iden-
tified privacy techniques. The columns of the table describe the characteristics that are relevant
to the author and are evaluated as follows: Type refers to the kind of LBS that the mechanism is
applicable to; techniques are the privacy techniques described in this section; Protected Region
assesses the scale of protection for each mechanism, it can take the values of: Entire Spatial
Domain (ESD), city, neighbourhood or it could be variable; Third Party is understood as stated
while describing the architectures for LPPMs (Item 3). The last column, indicates whether or
not the LPPM requires modification on the LBS Architecture. This table differs from the one
presented by Zurbarán et al. (2014) in the mechanisms included, privacy techniques covered
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Kalnis et al. (2007) All K-Anonymity & Spa-
tial Cloaking
Neighbourhood Yes Yes
Cheng et al. (2006) All Spatial Cloaking Neighbourhood No Yes
Monreale et al. (2013) All K-Anonymity & Spa-
tial Cloaking
Neighbourhood Yes Yes










Proactive Pseudonyms Variable Yes Yes
Zhong et al. (2007)
Louis
Proactive Cryptography-based ESD Yes Yes
Lester City No Yes
Pierre ESD No Yes
Mascetti et al. (2011) Proactive Cryptography-based ESD No Yes
C-Hide & Seek














LPPM Type Techniques Protected Region Third Party Alters LBS
Huang et al. (2008) Reactive Progressive Retrieval Neighbourhood No No













Reactive Temporal Cloaking &
K-Anonymity
Neighbourhood Yes No
Kido et al. (2005) Reactive Dummy Queries ESD No No
Quercia et al. (2011) Reactive Dummy Queries City / Variable No Yes
Lu and Jensen (2008) Reactive Dummy Queries City / Variable No Yes
Khoshgozaran and
Shahabi (2007)
Reactive PIR & Spatial Trans-
formation
ESD Yes Yes
Ghinita et al. (2008) Reactive PIR & Spatial Trans-
formation
ESD No Yes











Reactive PIR & Spatial Trans-
formation
ESD Yes Yes
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2.6 Discussion
The Comparison of LPPMs table comprises the LPPMs included in the Privacy Techniques
in LBS survey for this literature review. The characteristics evaluated for each LPPM have a
desirable value from the author’s perspective; ideally these would be as follows:
1. Type: All
2. Techniques: Any
3. Protected Region: ESD
4. Third Party: No
5. Alters LBS Architecture: No
Analysing the values on the table we find no match for such ideal model; however, there are
mechanisms that do comply with most of them. Among these characteristics, avoiding the need
for a third party or altering the LBS are critical for adoption, hence these will be prioritised.
The mechanisms that are worth highlighting with the previous considerations are:
• Ardagna et al. (2011); Wightman et al. (2011), based on obfuscation for these can be
applied to all types of LBS and do not require third parties or alterations;
• Huang et al. (2008); Wang and Wang (2009); Riboni et al. (2011), which use progressive
retrieval with no alterations on the LBS or need of third parties. Wang and Wang (2009);
Riboni et al. (2011) ensuring K-anonymity as well;
• Kido et al. (2005) based on dummy queries, providing a protected region of the ESD, but
at the cost of too many requests from each user.
There are others where the Protected Region is of the ESD, but do require modification on the
LBS. Mechanisms that allow this are presented in: (Zhong et al., 2007; Mascetti et al., 2011;
Wightman et al., 2012) cryptography-based and (Ghinita et al., 2008; Olumofin et al., 2010)
based on PIR.
With this canon in mind, the next chapter is dedicated to LPPMs developed by the author.
2.7 Summary
This chapter surveyed existing geoprivacy protection techniques and mechanisms; identifying
their purposes aided in creating a taxonomy and to uncover the existing common characteristics
to provide a ground for comparison between them.
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Chapter 3
Real Time Location Privacy Protection
Mechanisms
3.1 Introduction
As pointed out in the following quote:
One of the main challenges for geoprivacy is to balance the benefit for an indi-
vidual of participating on a geolocated application with the privacy risks he incurs
by doing so.
(Gambs et al., 2010, p. 34)
This chapter introduces LPPMs developed in this work to contribute to the thesis question and
objectives. Specifically this chapter relates to Research Objective 2 in the Thesis Motivation:
Design LPPMs that are reliable, scalable, efficient, non-intrusive and that allow geospatial
analysis. The chapter has two main sections: one dedicated to noise-base location obfuscation,
where a noise categorisation is explored, and the LPPMs developed using this technique. The
other section is dedicated to a cPIR mechanism for reactive LBS.
The Noise-based section is partially based on the book chapter by Wightman and Zurbarán
(2018) titled: An Initial Evaluation of the Impact of Location Obfuscation Mechanisms on
Geospatial Analysis.
3.2 Noise-based Location Obfuscation
Noise-based location privacy techniques are one of the simplest ways to protect the exact loca-
tion of the users. Its main characteristic is the induction of random noise to the original location
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obtained provided by a positioning system, in order to alter it permanently. Due to the random-
ness of the noise, it is very difficult to recover the original location, which becomes an useful
attribute in terms of security.
It is a priority that a mechanism is able to provide location privacy without third parties or
altering the LBS as seen in the Discussion of the previous chapter 2. Noise-based mechanisms
pose important advantages: among them is the possibility to enable geospatial analysis, since
the reported information is still in the form of geographic coordinates and they can be calculated
on the user’s device via simple calculations, thus computational complexity is low. In addition,
the user can customise these mechanisms by defining the maximum amount of noise that will
be applied to the locations; this range can go from 1 meter to a few kilometres, depending on
the application’s need for accuracy, and the perception of security that users have about their
decision.
A naive approach to these techniques would be that a larger noise area would be beneficial in
terms of security; however, it will degrade the quality of service for some applications. One
example of the impact of the amount of noise are geomarketing services: If a user has a noise
level of 3 kilometres, it may be reporting its location nearby a store in which he or she is not
really close to; thus a geolocated offer could be lost if it is a time restricted one.
Several statistical random distributions can generate the values needed for inducing noise:
Gaussian, Uniform, etc. The noise generation algorithm is the core element in these techniques.
Three LPPMs will be presented in this section, all of them based on a uniform distribution; this
is because it guarantees the highest variability on the data, which facilitates the generation of
far away points from the centre compared to a Gaussian distribution.
3.2.1 Noise categorisation
Polar-generated points are distributed more evenly than cartesian-generated along the radius.
Wightman and Zurbarán (2018) explore the generation of a single point inside an open ball in
two different ways as shown in Figure 3.1. The first one is the cartesian method, in which a
random number is generated for each component of the coordinate, added up and then the new
point is verified to fall inside the circle because it can happen that it falls on the external areas
on the square area of (2r)2.
The second one is the polar method, in which a distance and an angle are generated, transformed
into cartesian coordinates and added to the original point p. This technique does not require
validation because the random distance is validated to be between 0 and r; this ensures that it
cannot fall outside the circle.
Despite the fact that both generate a single point, the distribution of the random points shows
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Figure 3.1: Random generation of a point
differences between these techniques which may affect the impact of the algorithm. Figure 3.2
show the graphical distribution of 500 points using the cartesian and the polar approaches.
Even though cartesian-generated points look more evenly distributed along the area, without
a concentration of points, this impression is false: Polar-generated points are distributed more
evenly along the radius. The fact that there seems to be more points closer to the centre is due to
the symbol used to represent points, giving the impression of closeness, when in fact is a more
uniform distribution, as it can be appreciated in Figure 3.3; where the distance distribution (in
metres) is biased on the cartesian approach.
The main advantage of this technique is that it is very simple to implement. However, it can
generate values very close to the centre, which is not entirely desirable because the protection
for that specific point with no difference from the obfuscated one will be practically null. An
improvement that includes the generation of N random points, guarantees an increase in the
resulting induced noise, see (Wightman et al., 2011) for more details of this improvement (N-
Rand).
3.2.2 θ−Rand
This mechanism is inspired on the N-Rand mechanism presented by Wightman et al. (2011)
and included in the literature review under Location Obfuscation. In θ−Rand, each reported
location is treated individually and independently from the others. The following parameters
must be predefined by the user in order to apply the algorithm: rmax defines the maximum
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Figure 3.2: Cartesian and polar generation of 500 points
Figure 3.3: Distance distribution of cartesian and polar generation of 500 points
distance that an altered point can be from the reported original location, and n, which defines
how many trials will be performed per obfuscation in order to increase the average distance
of the output points from the real one. According to Wightman et al. (2011), a good rule-of-
thumb number is to define n as 4, in order to maintain some variability in the average distance
of the obfuscated points. This value for n will be considered for future noise-based obfuscation
algorithms.
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Figure 3.4: Graphical example of the θ -Rand algorithm
In order to apply the θ−Rand mechanism, the following steps should be followed:
1. Create a random circle sector s, by generating a θ angle and using the rmax radius.
2. The θ angle is calculated by the difference between 2 angles: θi between [0,180◦], and
θi +θ f , where θ f is also between [0,180◦].
3. Generate n points inside the circle sector s. In order to optimise computational time, a
point can be generated in terms of polar coordinates, generating a random distance less
than rmax, centred on the original location and an angle between θi and θ f .
4. Select the most distant point from the original point P, calculate the respective cartesian
coordinates, and report the obfuscated point instead of the original one.
In order to evaluate the resistance against filtering attacks, the Exponential Moving Average
filtering approach is proposed1; this technique is used in time series analysis in order to smooth
noise data with an underlying trend. When compared to N-Rand using synthetically generated
paths; θ -Rand proved to be more resistant to filtering, even though the induced noise by N-Rand
was greater.
Due to its non symmetrical dominion for random point generation, this LPPM can withstand
noise filtering attacks from exponential moving average techniques. This suggests that a uni-
form distribution is not always desirable.
Next subsection will present a mechanism inspired in a pinwheel form, providing a different
distribution of noise.
1(Wightman et al., 2011, p. 102)
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3.2.3 Pinwheel
Pinwheel was first introduced in Wightman et al. (2014), it is a mechanism inspired in the form
of pinwheel vanes; it uses a function to determine the added noise producing a distribution
pinwheel-like.
Figure 3.5: Graphical example of the Pinwheel algorithm
Figure 3.5 presents a graphical representation of how the Pinwheel algorithm works; where P is
the is the original location point at the centre of the circumference, rmax defines the radius and
φ defines the period for the repetition of the vanes that form the pinwheel. Each of which at a
given θ outputs the corresponding radius.
r(θ) = (θmodφ)/φ + rmax (3.1)
The noise added is calculated by defining a maximum radius, which is the maximum acceptable
noise to induce. The maximum radius serves to limit the dominium of the resulting obfuscated
location, but this dominium is also determined by the pinwheel formula in Equation 3.1; where
given a θ value, defines a specific radius for each θ within the circle described by the circumfer-
ence. This makes the selection of the radius a deterministic process in the generation of random
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points with low processing cost for doing on the fly transformations even on mobile devices,
the formula used to calculate r(θ) is applied using polar coordinates.
The φ value has a great impact on how the random points are distributed. Figure 3.6 show
the dominium of the random point generator with φ = 12◦ and φ = 110◦, respectively. In
the first case, high periodicity and a symmetric distribution shows a distribution very similar
to a uniform one, with the polar generation approach. The second case shows a much lower
periodicity and very restricted areas for the generation of points, which is also asymmetrical,
increasing the probability of generating points towards a sector of the circumference, which
proved to perform better against filtering attacks in (Wightman et al., 2014).
Figure 3.6: Pinwheel outputs with different φ angles
3.2.4 Near-Rand
Near-Rand is a noise-based algorithm for location obfuscation by Zurbaran et al. (2014). This
mechanism obfuscates the reported location by producing a point near the original location,
differing from its predecessors in that this mechanism is not limited to a circular dominium.
Rather, the obfuscated location is calculated using the mean coordinates of k nearest randomly
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generated points or neighbours; these neighbours are uniformly distributed within a coverage
area delimited by the user, i.e. the city where the user is at. Figure 3.7 depicts a sample
neighbour set over a squared area of 100 km2 in the city of Barranquilla.
Figure 3.7: Uniformly distributed points for Near-Rand algorithm
The neighbour set is calculated in the user device and is locally stored, if a user exits the cover-
age area i.e., travels to another city, a new one will have to be generated.
To ensure an average distance between the generated points, it is used the Equation 3.2 from
(Labrador and M. Wightman, 2009, p. 75), which is useful in wireless sensor networks to cal-
culate the Critical Transmission Range (CTR); in the equation r is the minimum homogeneous
transmission range of every node. For the purpose of this algorithm, r, represents the desired
distance between a pair of points in the specified coverage area. A small r will produce a high
density point set, which will generate closer neighbours to a reported location; on the other
hand, a lower density generates neighbours far from the original location.












The following are the algorithm steps for obfuscating a location with Near-Rand:
1. Fix an approximate value for r in Equation 3.3, then iteratively evaluate the function to
obtain the corresponding n to ensure the desired distance r.
2. Set k as the number of neighbours to include in the calculation of the mean coordinates;
a large k value increases the induced noise, especially with a low point density.
3. Calculate the mean coordinates of the k nearest neighbours from the reported location.
Figure 3.8: Obfuscated synthetic path with the Near-Rand algorithm variations
Figure 3.8 shows a comparison of two possible variations of Near-Rand; when the original
user location is included in the mean coordinates calculation, and when only the synthetically
generated neighbours are included. The original path in both cases is shown in red with the
obfuscated locations in green. The variation that does not include the original user location
proved to induce more noise, hence more location privacy.
This mechanism can include a non uniform distribution for the synthetically generated points,
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in a way that the user can specify sensitive zones to have lower point density i.e., a higher r,
which results in amplified added noise and more protection in those zones. An approach of how
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Figure 3.9: Non uniform neighbour distribution for differential privacy on sensitive locations
The use of a Poisson distribution with different λ values is explored, for this, the coverage area
is divided into cells from which the user can select the ones that require more privacy. The λ
value is fixed according to the desired privacy in a cell using Equation 3.4 for the distribution.
Figure 3.10 shows a sensitive cell delimited by the pink pins and a location reported within it in
green.
Pr(X = k) = (λ ke−λ )/k! (3.4)
Near-Rand is a flexible algorithm that can provide obfuscated locations with differential privacy
according to a user preferences using different settings. The induced noise depends on the
neighbour set and the specified k; in the performed experiments a value of 3 was used, producing
approximately 200 m of induced noise with a uniform distribution. See Zurbaran et al. (2014)
for more details on the experiments.
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Figure 3.10: Non uniform neighbour distribution for sensitive locations
3.3 MaPIR: Mapping-Based Private Information Retrieval
MaPIR is a cPIR LPPM (see subsection 2.5.3.4 Private Information Retrieval (PIR)) that uses
cryptography. This algorithm was presented by Wightman et al. (2013) and this section is partly
based on this article.
This mechanism is based on a squared grid granularity with redundant identification for the
cells. The IDs can be calculated with simple arithmetic operations on both, the mobile device
and server; these are a reduced transformation of geographic coordinates that have values in the
range from 1 to 10, so the ID alone does not reveal any location information.
The mapping function for MaPIR works in two phases: Location Reduction and ID calcula-
tion. The Location Reduction phase takes as parameter geographic coordinates and applies a
technique to transform latitude and longitude into numbers that still contain information about
location, without revealing it. In addition, this reduction technique should also preserve the
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Figure 3.11: Reduction based on scale
geographical relation between nearby PoIs and should be able to manage different scales, e.g.,
hundreds of meters, kilometres, tens of kilometres, etc., in order to adapt the searching area to
the user’s privacy requirements while enabling NN search.
The second phase is the ID calculation, where the reduced location numbers serve to generate
the ID of the cell containing the original location. The function for ID calculation must provide a
non-unique identification of the grid cells, such that they are sparsely and randomly distributed.
The proposed Location Reduction function in this work is the following:
1. Kth Digit Location Reduction: This is based on a simple idea; approximately, 9e− 6
degrees is equivalent to a meter in the Equator (360 degrees by 40,400 kilometres). Thus,
each significant digit on the location represents a scale of the distance, like shown in
Figure 3.11. For example, the following two latitudes 11.455199 and 11.455891 produce
the same reduction number when k = 2, this is 5, thus they are approximately within a
kilometre from each other. Formally, the proposed function is the use of the kth least
significant digit from the decimal portion of the location information, in order to reduce
this information. The main advantages of this technique are: It is very simple to calculate;
the reduced values are always in the same range [0-9]; and it can be adapted to different
search scales, without increasing the complexity.
2. Pseudo-random ID Calculation: Once both latitude and longitude have been reduced,
these values are used to define the ID of the grid cell in which the point is located. Let the
reduced values of latitude and longitude be i and j, and let p be the next prime value after
the maximum value that the reduction function can generate. Then, the ID of the grid cell
where the reduced point is located is calculated based on Equation 3.5.
ID(i, j) = d(i+1)∗ ( j+1)mod pe (3.5)
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Figure 3.12: Example of a PoI within a grid where k = 2 on Google Earth and a POI within a
cell where ID = 7
For the kth digit location reduction function, the p variable should be 11 as it is the next
prime number after 9, which is the maximum value that the location reduction function
can generate. The addition of 1 to the reduced components of the coordinates (i and j)
is necessary in order to avoid the value 0, which would nullify the multiplication. Figure
3.12 shows a sample mapped geographic location into its cell ID; furthermore, the final
grid for this mapping function is shown in Figure 3.13 for all possible values of i and j.
Each ID exists p−1 times in a single grid (10 in this case). This implies that the resultant grid
cell of a single location point queried by a user will be indistinguishable from other p−2 in the
same grid, so there is not a unique geographical correspondence. The p value must be a prime
in order to guarantee that each id exists on each row; otherwise, all ID values multiples of p
will generate redundant patterns in a single row.
The overall MaPIR process involves both user and server; the user’s mobile device obtains her
location through a positioning system and translates it into the corresponding MaPIR ID, for
this it is required that the user defines the scale that will be used; for an average city area, a
value of k = 2 is recommended. As for the server side, the LBS provider must also translate the
database of PoIs in a pre-processing stage using the mapping function for the offered scales;
this in order to minimise query processing time.
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Figure 3.13: MaPIR granularity grid IDs
The LBS provider should identify the geographical areas where the service will be available in
order to calculate the grids for those areas. Every time there is a new PoI added to the system,
this process has to be performed just for the new location without affecting the rest of the points.
The mapping must be restored completely only if the mapping technique itself is altered. PoIs
are stored in the database along with their computed IDs and type of interest, Figure 3.14 depicts
a sample view of the LBS database. A server side implementation for PostgreSQL using the
PostGIS extension is available in (Zurbarán et al., 2018, Chapter. 12).
Figure 3.14: MaPIR granularity grid IDs
When a NN query is issued, the user’s device sends it’s calculated cell ID and a query predicate,
e.g., restaurant, gas station, hotel, etc., in order to filter undesired PoIs to lower communication
costs while allowing the LBS to get statistics on their user’s interests; this predicate is not
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considered private. The server then retrieves all PoIs matching the requested ID and query
predicate, resulting in an increased number of retrieved PoIs that act as dummy results which
are later filtered by the user’s device in order to present only relevant results, i.e. the ones that
actually belong to the cell where the user is located. Figure 3.15 shows a visual output of a






Figure 3.15: Example of a MaPIR request where ID = 6
The MaPIR mechanism enforces location privacy and allows querying PoIs with great accuracy,
in an efficient manner, and without revealing the actual location of the users. Performance tests
proved MaPIR query processing time to be more efficient than when using dummy queries and
even when compared to a regular spatial query 2.
2See (Wightman et al., 2013, p. 969) for performance test details
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3.4 Discussion
With noise-based techniques, once the user location is altered, the original data is lost. This
means that the service provider will receive only a probabilistic hint of where the user was,
which, depending on the induced noise, will have value for geospatial analysis.
Noise-base obfuscation techniques are susceptible to filtering attacks, when the Exponential
Moving Average was used to filter noise, it proved that a uniform noise distribution, i.e., the
one used in Rand and N-Rand, is more likely to be filtered than when the induced noise is
somehow biased; therefore the need for creating non-uniform noise-based mechanisms like the
ones presented in this chapter: θ -Rand, Pinwheel and Near-Rand.
The MaPIR mechanism is based on cPIR and is applicable to reactive LBS; it requires a map-
ping function to be implemented in both, user’s device and server.
The following is an extension of the table presented in Section 2.5.3.5 that compares the LPPMs
presented in this chapter through characteristics based on concepts presented on Chapter 2.





















Reactive PIR City / Variable No Yes
Table 3.1: Comparison of LPPMs
A Protected Region in Table 3.1 is said to be variable when the LPPM is able to adapt to dif-
ferent scales depending on the LBS requirements. In the case of proactive LBS, obfuscation
mechanisms should use a small amount of noise3, hence a neighbourhood sized area is sug-
gested; but for reactive LBS, the location distortion could be greater. The amount of induced
noise in location obfuscation will be further addressed on next chapters as well as the usability
of the obfuscated data for geospatial analysis.
As for the estimated Protected Region of MaPIR, it is said to be variable due to the possibility
of applying this mechanism on different scales; however, the use of a city scale is recommended
3As explored by Seidl et al. (2015), “In Gaussian random perturbation tested in France, personal residences
are identifiable with a standard deviation of 50 m, but are indiscernible beyond 200m according to Gambs et al.
(2010). Given these considerations, the radii implemented here are 30, 100 and 250m.”
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i.e. when k = 2, for communication costs might be prohibitive in a bigger Protected Region.
In the scope of this work it is not contemplated the use of geographic information protected by
MaPIR or any other PIR-based mechanism for geospatial analysis.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has introduced geoprivacy mechanisms developed in this work to be implemented
while the LBS is offering its functionalities. Real-time LPPMs behave as if the LBS provider
was untrusted and requires some knowledge of the LBS application in order to parametrise
adequately the induce perturbation. Different mechanisms were introduced belonging to the
Location Obfuscation techniques and a PIR mechanism. This chapter concludes that noise-
based location obfuscation are less intrusive; however the MaPIR mechanism provides higher
privacy protection.
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Chapter 4
Location Privacy Protection Mechanisms
for Third Party Information Release
4.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces LPPMs developed in this work to contribute to the thesis question and
objectives; specifically, this chapter relates to Research Objective 2 in the Thesis Motivation:
Design LPPMs that are reliable, scalable, efficient, non-intrusive and that allow geospatial
analysis, emphasising in the utility of protected data for geospatial analysis.
It could be argued that LPPMs can be applied at two different moments: when the user is
reporting the data to the LBS and after the data has been transmitted and stored, and privacy be-
comes only a concern when data leaves the service provider. In the first case, such mechanisms
are referred in this work as Real Time LPPMs and are the ones explored so far. On the other
hand, there are LPPMs for Third Party Information Release and under this model, the LBS is
considered trusted.
It is not incorrect to assume a model where the LBS is trusted, since under current regulations
a key element of the business model of social media platforms is to sell data from their users to
third party companies. Therefore, the LBS have unrestricted access to the original information.
Even though it is expected that information released through a LBS API is already distorted or
aggregated, the format of the information is not known by the public; so there is no certainty
from the user’s point of view of how much information is being revealed, despite the final use of
the information e.g., marketing, research, government planning, etc. For these cases, there is a
lack of specific legislation on location information, being this just regarded as general personal
information.
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The mechanisms introduced in this chapter aim to provide location privacy to the data, once the
trusted service provider has it and before it is shared with third party actors. The objective for
these mechanisms is to distort data in such a way that individual’s location privacy is preserved,
while maintaining the value of the data in terms of data representation, since this data can be
used for research or commercial purposes.
4.2 VoKA: Voronoi K-Aggregation Mechanism
The Voronoi-based K-Aggregation technique (VoKA) was introduced by Zurbaran and Wight-
man (2017) and this section is partly based on this paper. VoKA is an LPPMs for Third Party
Information Release that allows to group users reported locations based on density and not just
by area; giving a much better idea of the real distribution of the data, while preserving a level
of K-anonymity among the users.
Voka is an offline mechanism designed to aggregate datasets of geolocated data in a way that
protects isolated sources from individualisation based on location. When aggregating datasets
there are 4 main types of data geolocated sources, based on the number of entries and the
number of nearby sources: popular areas, isolated points of interest, low density living areas
and isolated living areas as depicted in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Identification of data sources based on number of entries and number of neighbours
• Popular areas are characterised by a large number of total entries and a large number
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of geolocated sources. This area is usually located in the city centres or in commercial
districts, with many PoIs like restaurants, museum, etc.
• Isolated points of interest represent specific places that attract a large number of people
and that generate a large number of entries, i.e. PoIs located in the outskirts of a city, an
event like a concert, etc.
• Low density living areas represent residential districts of the city, in which people are less
likely to generate geolocated entries, but there are a large number of sources.
• Finally, isolated living areas represent especial residential districts or low traffic points of
interest, probably in rural areas, in which there is a small number of entries and not many
different sources.
The last two being most critical of the geolocated sources because identification of the individ-
uals, over time, may be fairly easy if the information is linked with other public information.
The VoKA algorithm will aggregate nearby sources with low number of entries, in order to
generalise their location and merge the entries to a minimum amount that will reduce the prob-
ability of individualisation. This technique is designed to work offline i.e, after data collection,
on a trusted service provider, and before the data is sent to a third party; either as open access,
for commercial or for research purposes.
The first two variables that the algorithm requires to define before aggregating the data are:
the number of entries that will identify an acceptable level of anonymity, K, and the maximum
distance that will determine if two sources are neighbours, D. In general, there are no magic
numbers for these variables, and they somewhat depend on the type of data, the city, and other
parameters. However, in this work, we propose that the minimum number of entries, K, could
be defined based on Equation 4.1:
K = max(P50,Kmin) (4.1)
where P50 represents the number of entries at the 50th percentile of the geolocated sources, and
Kmin is a value defined by the administrator of the service provider. In this work we proposed
using a Kmin = 20, so the algorithm will try to ensure at least 20 entries per aggregated feature
or that the feature is like the top 50% of the sources.
This algorithm is divided into two stages:
1. Grid-Reduction: The coordinates of each location are approximated to a certain number
of decimal digits, e.g., 5, 4 or 3. This provides a first level of aggregation and privacy
protection, by merging the location entries on a grid-based distribution. This approxi-
mation is similar to the one used by MaPIR 1. However, this kind of aggregation can
1See Section 3.3 MaPIR: Mapping-Based Private Information Retrieval.
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affect location information in different scales according to the geographic area where the
location entries where generated. In other words, if the dataset is nearby the Equator,
the scale presented for MaPIR in Figure 3.11 remains relevant; otherwise, the distance
of the aggregated locations from original ones will depend on the Universal Transverse
Mercator (UTM) zone where the data originated. i.e.; in locations around Milano, Italy,
each decimal digit approximate a distance magnitude: the 5th decimal digit represents 70
cm; the 4th, 7 m; the 3rd, 70 m, etc.
2. KD-Aggregation: The second step starts by:
(a) Sorting the geolocated sources by their number of entries, from smaller to largest,
then by latitude and finally, by longitude.
(b) Then, a greedy dominating set algorithm is applied over the list of points with less
than K entries; in the beginning, all will start as not visited and not dominated: for
each non visited location L, the algorithm will mark it as visited and look for other
non visited locations within distance D (see Figure 4.3a).
(c) Points within that distance D are evaluated with the Delaunay triangulation to iden-
tify direct neighbours, only those will be added to a list of closest neighbours and
marked as visited and dominated (see Figure 4.3b).
(d) This process is repeated until all nodes are visited (see Figure 4.3c). In this way,
each visited node will represent a local Voronoi neighbourhood that does not extend
farther that a distance D, increasing the anonymity of the entries and generalising
the area.
Given that only areas with isolated points are merged, the ones that already comply with
the defined K-anonymity setting, remain the same as in original data. As seen in Figure
4.3b, the locations with small number of entries are now protected by absorbing the entries
of their neighbours, representing now a wider area. The final Voronoi diagram generated
with these points and their number of aggregated entries, will then represent the protected
dataset.
Choosing a less precise approximation digit on the Grid-Reduction stage will create less number
of sources, larger number of entries per aggregated location and a coarse representation of the
data, as in Figure 4.2. On the other hand, selecting a more precise approximation digit, will cre-
ate a large number of sources, and some of them will have very little number of entries or zero,
especially on the low density and isolated living areas. Event though this aggregation could be
used with even lower precision to include the isolated living areas, the amount of information
that will be lost from popular areas would be devastating to the value of the information, which
is the main issue this technique aims to avoid.
For the sake of evaluating the behaviour of this mechanism, a dataset of 18,966 tweets collected
through the Twitter Streaming API 2 from Milano, Italy in 2016 is used as shown in Figure
2The code for data collection is available at: https://github.com/mazucci/geocollect. However, due
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Figure 4.2: Example of grid reduction of data sources based on number of entries and neigh-
bours
4.4. In order to visually gather information on the overall distribution of the tweet sample, a
density Voronoi diagram is generated with the original data and shown in Figure 4.5; where
unique coordinates were used to created weighted points with the count of repetitions of the
same coordinates found in the sample.
When the Grid-Reduction stage of the algorithm is applied, approximating from 5 to 2 decimal
digits is explored. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 are the outputs generated from a density Voronoi diagram
for these reduction settings.
Figure 4.6 a. and b., respectively, show the output when 5 and 4 digits are used. This, in
comparison to Figure 4.7 a. and b., preserves more similarity to the Voronoi diagram from the
original tweets in Figure 4.5. When more decimals digits are approximated, the distribution
becomes more grid-like, as it is clearly observed when 2 digits are used in Figure 4.7 b.; this,
off-course, is too much of a loss of data representation; therefore a value of 4 is recommended
according to these trials.
For the second stage of Voka; KD-Aggregation, a 4 digit Grid-Reduction is selected and tested
for a distance D of 500 m shown in Figure 4.8, 1 km and 2 km in Figures 4.9 a. and b. respec-
tively.
From the KD-Aggregated density Voronoi diagrams, it can be seen how the distance D affects
the output; when 500 m is used, more polygons are generated than with distances of 1 or 2 km.
to changes in APIs, this code is no longer maintained.
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  Figure 4.3: Example of the application of KD-Aggregation over data, assuming K = 20 and
distance D.
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Figure 4.4: Original twitter sample data from Milano, Italy over a Stamen Toner/OSM basemap
Therefore, this distance parameter should be set according to the privacy concerns of the data
owner. For this dataset, a distance of 500 m still provides a generalised representation of the
original data where high density locations are found in the centre and only few in the outskirts
of Milano.
Given that the VoKA algorithm obfuscates by aggregating, it produces data that appear more
evenly distributed but with overlapping locations. For a visual understanding of the obfuscated
points resulting from this, see Figure 4.10. When this map is compared to the one in Figure
4.4, it seems like the one produced with VoKA have fewer locations, but this is not the case, the
locations are simply overlapped due to aggregation.
The Voronoi-based K-Anonymity algorithm, Voka, presents a viable alternative for data aggre-
gation that takes into account locality and protects isolated sources of information, potentially
vulnerable for individualisation attacks, while preserving the quality of information in locations
that do not require privacy treatment. The main drawback of VoKA is that it can still gener-
ate locations that do not comply with the K-anonymity requirement due to locality; i.e. if an
isolated point does not find enough nearby points to aggregate enough entries, it may still be
vulnerable.
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Figure 4.5: Density Voronoi diagram of original twitter sample data from Milano, Italy
Figure 4.6: Density Voronoi diagram of the first stage of VoKA mechanism; Grid-Reduction,
with 5 a. and 4 digits b.
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Figure 4.7: Density Voronoi diagram of the first stage of VoKA mechanism; Grid-Reduction,
with 3 a. and 2 digits b.
Figure 4.8: Density Voronoi diagram of KD-Aggregation using a 4 digits Grid-Reduction and
the distance is set to 500 m
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Figure 4.9: Density Voronoi diagram of KD-Aggregation using a 4 digits Grid-Reduction and
the distance is set to 1 km a. and 2 km b.
Figure 4.10: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
4 digit Grid Reduction and 500 m used for KD-Aggregation
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4.3 NRand-K
The N-Rand algorithm presented by Wightman et al. (2011) and reviewed in Chapter 2 Section
Location Obfuscation is an alternative for obfuscating geographic information while using the
LBS (real-time), with a low computational footprint, that does not require previous knowledge
from the context of the user; like extension of the area of interest, how many other users are on
the area, etc. However, deciding an optimal maximum noise radius becomes the main issue, as
it happens with obfuscation techniques. Both before the implementation (which is a good noise
level?) and after the data collection (how much did the data changed? Is the data still useful?).
For a visual representation of the N-Rand algorithm see Figure 3.4a.
Koufogiannis and Pappas (2016) show how the exploitation of location privacy should depend
on the population density, where sparsely populated areas need tighter privacy protection. This
concept was introduced to the NRand-K algorithm, where a greater obfuscation takes place,
only if there are less than K users in a delimited area; otherwise, the added noise is a minimum
preset in order to still provide protection, but with limited distortion of the data. This is analo-
gous to the concept of k-anonymity: where the location of a user is considered anonymous if k-1
other users are in the same area. Similarly, in NRand-K areas with higher density of reported
locations are considered safer against inferences in an anonymous dataset than areas with fewer
locations.
Since NRand-K is intended to be used by a trusted service provider when the collected location
information is going to be released, this mechanisms does not require a third party nor a peer to
peer approach, as is usually the case with techniques than enforce K-anonymity.
NRand-K uses aggregation to determine local density, this aggregation can be done using a grid
of squared cells, a fishnet, administrative boundaries or by other means at the discretion of the
service provider. The K parameter is set having into consideration the overall concentration
of reported locations in the spatial extension of the study. This value could be set arbitrarily,
but it is recommended to use the 75th percentile (P75) of the distribution of the resulting point
count within each polygon used for aggregating. Then, if this count is equal or greater than K,
a minimum noise (rmin) is added using the NRand algorithm to each coordinate in the polygon;
otherwise, if the number of points is less thank K, the full maximum noise (rmax) is applied.
The algorithm is described as follows:
1. Set values for rmax and rmin.
2. Aggregate geographical coordinates into polygons and calculate each polygon point den-
sity.
3. Let K be P75 of the calculated polygon densities.
4. For each polygon evaluate if its point count is less than K, if so, apply the N-Rand algo-
rithm for all locations reported within the polygon with a radius of maxr; otherwise do so
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with an obfuscation radius of minr.
Figure 4.11: Sample of NRand-K where K = 5
Figure 4.11 shows a sample of the noise dominium for NRand-K, depicting smaller areas around
the blue locations for the NRand algorithm where there is higher concentration of points, this is
where there are at least 6 locations for this example (K=6). On the other hand, cells where there
are isolated points or cells with low density, NRand-K uses a bigger dominium for inducing
noise as shown in cells with less than 6 points, where the circles around the blue points are
larger. With the addition of noise, some points may fall in a different polygon than the one they
were initially aggregated; this consequence of altering the data is one that can cause an impact
in spatial analysis. NRand-K aims to minimise this impact by reducing the dominium where
this may happen. A variation to overcome this issue, is to generate random points until the
obfuscated location falls within the polygon containing the original location.
Given that the main goal of the proposed NRand-K algorithm is to provide a decision factor
for inducing noise based on the overall spatial density of the data, it can be used with other
noise-based obfuscation mechanisms than NRand, such as θ−Rand or Pinwheel.
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4.4 Discussion
Mechanisms for protecting location information for release to third parties rely on the service
provider; it is the LBS that ultimately decides wether or not to distort location information, and
defines the parameters that these mechanisms require, in order to generate the allowed distor-
tion. This privacy protection schema for publishing information is also explored by Wieland
et al. (2008) while releasing health geolocated information.
In this chapter it was assessed the use of two LPPMs and according to performed experiments,
some default settings are recommended for the parameters used by the introduced mechanisms.
VoKA and NRand-K are both based on spatial aggregation, which is a common practice for
geospatial analysis; therefore, considering this as a mean to obfuscate locations in a way that
still represent the original data is not only reasonable, but consistent and only possible if the
owner of the geo-referenced data performs these proposed mechanisms.
(Monreale et al., 2013, p. 11) stresses that “arbitrary territory divisions, such as administra-
tive districts or regular grids, do not reflect the spatial distribution of the data” and suggests
a Voronoi tessellation for aggregating. This concept is embedded in the VoKA mechanism,
offering the possibility to aggregate based on the distribution of the reported locations and not
depending on administrative boundaries or static grids.
The NRand-K algorithm presents a way to integrate the concept of K-anonymity and location
obfuscation in real scenarios, offering the possibility to include the aggregation of the data in the
decision of how much noise is required. Other metrics, such as the historical density of reported
locations are proposed for estimating the K parameter. On the next chapter, experiments will
be performed for NRand-K and VoKA exploring how these algorithms minimise the impact on
geospatial analysis.
4.5 Chapter Summary
This section introduced LPPMs developed throughout this work that are applicable after the
data collection stage; when the LBS has provided its services and wishes to reuse the collected
data for sharing with third parties. These kinds of LPPMs benefit from the availability of the
dataset to protect; having initial knowledge of the characteristics of the data enable a better
selection of the input parameters for the algorithms. Both mechanisms presented in this chapter
use K-anonymity as a criteria to provide geoprivacy.
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Chapter 5
Assessing Impact of Location Privacy on
Geospatial Analysis
5.1 Introduction
The need for addressing privacy issues while being able to obtain feedback in LBS has been a
concern for some years, in the work of (Beresford and Stajano, 2004, p. 5), they state:
“Enabling location privacy is going to become increasingly important in a
world where location-aware services are available over larger and larger geo-
graphical areas. Deploying systems that support location privacy for users and
provide feedback about the level of anonymity users have may prove critical to the
widespread adoption of location-aware services.”
Measuring the impact of LPPMs in geospatial analysis is now a necessary step, in order to
understand how these analyses will be affected if there is a massive adoption of privacy protec-
tion techniques, either due to public awareness or due to legislation and enforced geoprivacy
standards; probably both.
This chapter is dedicated to understand the impact that location obfuscation techniques have
in geospatial analyses. For this, the performance of ESDA tools such as hotspot analysis and
heatmaps is evaluated; the calculation of global spatial indices is also explored to quantify
alterations of the data after applying privacy protection mechanisms. The select LPPMs to test
in this chapter are Pinwheel, NRand-K and VoKA: Voronoi K-Aggregation Mechanism; the
outputs of the geospatial analyses obtained with the original and obfuscated datasets will serve
for comparison.
The chapter is organised as follows: a section dedicated to describe the methodology used for
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evaluating the LPPMs independent of the specificities of each mechanism, followed by a section
dedicated to the performed experiments with each of the selected LPPM. At last, a comparison
section is dedicated to evaluate the performance of each mechanism in terms of alterations on
geospatial analysis. This chapter contributes to the Research Objective 3: Asses the impact of
LPPMs based on obfuscation and aggregation on geospatial analysis. Which addresses the last
component of the thesis question: How to provide location privacy with mechanisms that are
scalable, efficient, non-intrusive and with low impact on geospatial analysis?
5.2 Methodology
The experiments were performed using the QGIS software in the version 2.18 ‘Las Palmas’1
and other calculations were done using libreOffice2. The following subsections will explain in
detail the data sources and the specificities on how the experiments were conducted; in general
all software used is Free and Open Source (FOSS).
5.2.1 Data
The data used in this chapter is geo-referenced Twitter data collected through their Streaming
API 3. The collection was ongoing for the most part of 2016 and limited to tweets generated in
Italy. This allowed to have a large dataset for different cities throughout a continuous period. For
these experiments, the original dataset includes 18966 geo-referenced tweets from the city of
Milano, Italy collected from February to May of 2017. From this thesis view, the collected data
comes from a platform that offered an ‘opt-in’ agreement at the time of collection; therefore,
from what was stated in the literature review Section Crowdsourced Spatial Data Collection,
this data is considered as VGI.
For performing hotspot analysis, data must be aggregated; for this aggregation, the adminis-
trative boundaries are used. In the case of the city of Milano, the neighbourhoods or ‘Nuclei
d’Identità Locale’ in Italian, are used 4.
1qgis.org/en/site/forusers/alldownloads.html
2libreoffice.org
3The code for data collection is available at: github.com/mazucci/geocollect. However, due to changes in APIs,
this code is no longer maintained.
4Shapefiles available from the Milano Geoportale
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5.2.2 Heatmaps
The computation of raster heatmaps on spatial data estimates the density based on pixel values
of the data distribution. Each pixel is evaluated within a radius or bandwidth predefined by the
analyser.
The Heatmap plugin uses Kernel Density Estimation to create a density (heatmap)
raster of an input point vector layer. The density is calculated based on the number
of points in a location, with larger numbers of clustered points resulting in larger
values4.
For the creation of heatmaps, it was used the Heatmap plugin for QGIS5. The bandwidth for
this analysis was set to 1km, using linear interpolation and a continuous mode to classify the
heatmap rasters in all cases. The rasters are then normalised by subtracting the mean and divid-
ing this by the standard deviation.
These classification maps, aid in exploring datasets in order to identify atypical concentrations
relative to the events present in the analysis. For means of visualisation, the kernel density
values are classified within ranges, these ranges are visually presented through a colour palette,
where each colour represents a magnitude or temperature; the colour indicated with a higher
value in the legend implies a higher concentration of features. This classification is good as
an initial approach for understanding the distribution and key areas of the overall domain, but
density maps alone cannot determine statistical significance.
5.2.3 Hotspot Analysis
Hotspot analysis calculates the Getis-Ord local statistic Gi∗ (Ord and Getis, 1995), in order to
define areas of atypical high point density occurrence, named hot spots, versus atypical areas of
low occurrence, named cold spots. The z-scores and p-values resulting from the Gi∗ are tested
with the null hypothesis (i.e. complete spatial randomness) for each feature.
In order to perform this analysis on spatial coordinates with no predefined weigh variable asso-
ciated, the aggregation of points in a certain area is the viable option. For this work, a vector
layer of 85 neighbourhoods of Milan was used for aggregating; the resulting features for the
analysis are the polygons associated with the corresponding count of tweets within each neigh-
bourhood i.e., polygon density. These are the input for the Hotspot Analysis Plugin which was
performed using a queen’s case lookup to calculate hotspots statistical significance value.
The hotspot analysis in contrast with heatmaps, enables to determine statistical significance. For
5QGIS Heatmap Plugin
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the performance of these experiments, the QGIS Hotspot Analysis plugin presented in (Oxoli
et al., 2017) was used; refer to this work for a detailed explanation of the algorithm6.
Reckoning the variations of hotspots of obfuscated and original data as a measure to compare
LPPMs has been explored by Kounadi and Leitner (2015), the authors emphasise the importance
of doing this given the relevance of clustering in geospatial analysis.
Another effect of masks is the variations between hotspots derived from masked
and original incident locations. This was an additional information dimension by
Armstrong et al. (1999), where they examined the existence, the actual locations,
and the relative locations of masked compared to original clusters. Similarly, Kwan
et al. (2004) calculated the clustering distance using the cross K function analysis...
Leitner and Curtis (2004) compared the similarity of observed hotspots, drawn by
participants, which were derived from masked and original points...
The impact assessment in this work is based on quantifying the change between the outputs of
the hotspot analysis for the different LPPMs compared to the output with the original data. For
this, the number of new hotspots that appeared in the results after applying obfuscation (false
positives), the hotspots that disappeared (false negatives) and statistical significance variations
are considered.
5.2.4 Spatial Indices
To analyse other properties of spatial data, indices presented by (Kounadi and Leitner, 2015,
p. 745) are evaluated for obfuscated and original datasets, specifically, the mean’s divergence
index (Mdi) and the orientation’s divergence index (Odi) . The Mdi is calculated with Equation
5.1, where the mean values are calculated with the QGIS software and Odi is calculated as
denoted in Equation 5.2, the values for the angle orientation of the standard deviational ellipse
(SDE) are calculated using the QGIS plugin designed for this analysis 7.
Mdi =
d(original mean,obfuscated mean)
d(original mean, farthest point in study area)
∗100 (5.1)
Odi =
|orientation angle of original SDE−orientation angle of obfuscated SDE|
180
∗100 (5.2)
In order to verify how the original aggregation of the data is affected after obfuscation, the
difference between the point count per each polygon used to aggregate the original data (original
6The code is available at github.com/danioxoli/HotSpotAnalysis_Plugin
7plugins.qgis.org/plugins/SDEllipse
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point count) and the point count after obfuscation (obfuscated point count) is used to calculate
the point count’s divergence index (PCDi). This index is calculated using all polygons included
in the analysis and is formally described in Equation 5.3; the MPCDi is designed to identify







, where n = polygons in the analysis (5.3)
5.3 Experiments
The following subsections illustrate the outputs of the experiments performed with the original
dataset and the ones with the resulting obfuscated datasets using the selected LPPMs; these
output maps aim to provide a visual understanding of the alterations that LPPMs imply on
geospatial analysis. Furthermore, the legends for both heatmaps and hotspot analysis, serve for
quantifying alterations between datasets.
5.3.1 Original Dataset
This section shows the resulting outputs for heatmap and hotspot analysis using the original
dataset of 18,966 geo-referenced tweets in the city of Milano, Italy. In both maps, a concentra-
tion in the centre is spotted; in Figure 5.1 there are two high density clusters, but these appear
as if they are merged into one big cluster, making it hard to differentiate between them.
As for the hotspot analysis, the five central neighbourhoods highlighted in Figure 5.2, corre-
spond to the most touristic areas and oldest part of the city, some important landmarks in these
neighbourhoods are the Duomo di Milano, the Galleria Vittorio Emanuele and the Teatro alla
Scala. The concentration of tweets in this area could be explained by people tweeting for touris-
tic purposes; however, the semantic analysis of the text in the tweets falls outside of the scope
of this work.
The experimental results for this scenario using the original tweets will serve as a canon when
comparing against analyses performed with obfuscated datasets; generated using the different
LPPMs as described in the following subsections.
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Figure 5.1: Heatmap generated with original tweets in Milano, Italy
Figure 5.2: Output for hotspot analysis generated with original tweets in Milano, Italy
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5.3.2 Pinwheel
The Pinwheel algorithm requires two parameters; a φ angle to determine the periodicity of
the pinwheel vanes according to Equation 3.1 and an rmax, which is the maximum distance an
obfuscated location can be from the original one. In these experiments, the Pinwheel algorithm
was tested with different rmax values: 500m and 1km, and the period parameter φ was set to
105◦in all the experiments in order to have lower periodicity and an asymmetrical random point
generation domain; making it more resilient against filtering attacks as mentioned in Subsection
3.2.3 of Chapter 3 where the mechanism was first introduced in this thesis.
Figure 5.3: Heatmap generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with rmax = 500m
Figure 5.3 shows a heatmap output using tweets obfuscated with Pinwheel with an rmax of
500m. At first sight this map is very similar to the heatmap produced with the original tweets;
however a diminished concentration can be appreciated when comparing the legends, where
a difference of 0.3 can be appreciated in the highest temperature values. This becomes more
evident with the output of the heatmap produced with the obfuscated dataset using an rmax of
1km in Figure 5.4, in this case, the highest concentration in the legend decreases to 11.6 from
that of 13.3 tweets on the heatmap produced with the original dataset in Figure 5.1, differing in
a value of 1.7.
Further analising these maps by subtracting each of the RGB channels and generating a diver-
gence heatmap (or heatmap of differences)8 as the ones shown in Figure 5.5. These heatmaps
8Using the script by Mavridis (2012).
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Figure 5.4: Heatmap generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with rmax = 1km
Figure 5.5: Heatmap divergence by pixels between the original data heatmap and the Pinwheel
heatmaps generated with an rmax = 500m and rmax = 1km
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Figure 5.6: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
rmax = 500m
Figure 5.7: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
rmax = 1km
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shows highlighted pixels where these images differ; the lighter the colour, the higher the error
or difference between the original and the obfuscated heatmap. For the case of the obfuscated
tweets with Pinwheel, the divergence heatmaps show more difference with an rmax = 1km than
when the rmax was 500m.
Even though the process for generating the heatmaps remains the same for all experiments;
using a bandwidth of 1km, a linear interpolation and a continuous mode for classifying the
heatmap rasters, the variations in the legend values of these maps indicate a more sparse point
distribution. These variation in the legends serve to identify how the induced noise decreases
the concentration in clusters originally identified.
The hotspot analysis outputs using these obfuscated datasets evidence differences from the one
produced with the original dataset (Figure 5.2); in both variations of these experiments using
rmax of 500m (Figure 5.6) and 1km (Figure 5.7), now distinct hotspots appear on the output
maps. There is a clear relation between the induced noise and sparsity of the obfuscated data
with this mechanism, both heatmap and hotspot analysis reflect this; Figure 5.6 marks a new
hot spot with a 99% statistical significance that was not present in the original analysis, while
Figure 5.6 marks two new hot spots; the one mentioned previously when using rmax of 500m
and a new one with a 90% statistical significance.
5.3.3 NRand-K
For the NRand-K algorithm details refer to the Section 4.3 of Chapter 4 where this mechanism
was introduced. In the experiments presented below, the K parameter was set to the 75th per-
centile (P75) of the point count frequency of the 85 neighbourhoods in Milano, which resulted
in a value of 149. This means that reported tweets within neighbourhoods with 149 or more
tweets were altered with a minimum noise (rmin) that was set to 50m in all cases, while tweets
reported within neighbourhoods with a point count of less than 149 were obfuscated using rmax.
The rmax parameter was set to 500m and 1km in order to be able to compare with both rmax
variations evaluated using the Pinwheel mechanism in the previous subsection.
In order to avoid generating obfuscated locations outside the area of the study or locations that
fall in different neighbourhoods from the one where the original location was, the algorithm
was restricted to provide only obfuscated locations within the neighbourhood polygon of the
original location used to generate it. The results with both variations of NRand-K are presented
as follows:
When compared to the heatmap from the original dataset in Figure 5.1, the output maps for
NRand-K with rmax = 500m in Figures 5.8 and 5.15 show greater similarity than those generated
with the Pinwheel mechanism; particularly if noting the values in the scales of the legends. For
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Figure 5.8: Heatmap generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with rmax = 500m
Figure 5.9: Heatmap generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with rmax = 500m and
polygon restriction
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Figure 5.10: Heatmap generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with rmax = 1km
Figure 5.11: Heatmap generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with rmax = 1km and
polygon restriction
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Figure 5.12: Heatmap divergence by pixels between the original data heatmap and the NRand-K
heatmaps generated with an rmax = 500m and rmax = 1km
Figure 5.13: Heatmap divergence by pixels between the original data heatmap and the NRand-K
(with polygon restriction) heatmaps generated with an rmax = 500m and rmax = 1km
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Figure 5.14: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
rmax = 500m
Figure 5.15: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
rmax = 500m and polygon restriction
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Figure 5.16: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
rmax = 1km
Figure 5.17: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
rmax = 1km and polygon restriction
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the heatmap output with NRand-K where rmax = 500m, the highest concentration of tweets is
of 13.2 compared to 13.3 in the heatmap with the original dataset; differing only by a value
of 0.1 in terms of heatmap density. With an rmax = 1km the output in Figure 5.10 is visually
more different from the original data heatmap than the one produced with an rmax = 500m. In
the legend for this map, the density value for the highest concentration is 13.6, differing by 0.3
from 13.3 which was the highest concentration for the original data. However, the heatmap
generated using NRand-K with polygon restriction and rmax = 1km, shows a maximum value
of 13.4, which is closer to 13.3.
Analysing the heatmap divergence for both variation of NRand-K in Figures 5.12 and 5.13,
again show fewer differences when the rmax = 500m is used. The average value for this measure
can be found and compared in the last column of Table 5.1, evidencing what the heatmap figures
suggest if comparing between both NRand-K variations: a greater difference when the polygon
restriction is enforced in the algorithms for both rmax scenarios.
The relation inferred from the NRand-K heatmap comparison using the values in the scales of
the legends is not as clear as it was with the Pinwheel algorithm; the more induced noise, a
greater decrease in the scale values. Since the noise induced by NRand-K not only depends on
an rmax parameter, but includes the criteria of a minimum K point count per neighbourhood that
defines if an rmax or an an rmin is used; the distribution of the data cannot be said to become
more sparse even if a greater rmax is used, this mechanism rather aims to ensure that regardless
the rmax used, density clusters present in the original dataset are preserved and this is evidenced
in these experiments.
The resulting outputs for hotspot analysis in both rmax variations; Figure 5.14, Figure 5.16 and
Figure 5.17 are identical to the one produced with the original tweet coordinates in Figure 5.2.
These results support what was inferred from the heatmap calculation; the NRand-K preserves
better the cluster density regardless of the rmax when compared to the Pinwheel mechanism.
It is worth mentioning, that since the input for the hotspot analysis is the polygon shapefile
with their respective counts, the NRand-K mechanism with polygon restriction will preserve
the hotspot analysis result in all cases.
5.3.4 VoKA
According to the VoKA algorithm there are two stages as described in Section 4.2, namely,
Grid Reduction and KD Aggregation. For the Grid Reduction stage, a 4 digit reduction was
chosen; this translates into approximately 10m of accuracy loss. For the KD-Aggregation stage,
a distance value D of 500m was used.
Figure 5.18 shows the output for the heatmap calculation with the tweet coordinates after ap-
plying the VoKA obfuscation algorithm. When comparing the values on the heatmap scale to
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Figure 5.18: Heatmap generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with 4 digit Grid
Reduction and 500m used for KD-Aggregation
Figure 5.19: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
4 digit Grid Reduction and 500m used for KD-Aggregation
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Figure 5.20: Heatmap generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with 4 digit Grid
Reduction and 1km used for KD-Aggregation
Figure 5.21: Heatmap divergence by pixels between the original data heatmap and the VoKA
heatmaps generated with an rmax = 500m and rmax = 1km
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Figure 5.22: Output for hotspot analysis generated with obfuscated tweets in Milano, Italy with
4 digit Grid Reduction and 1km used for KD-Aggregation
those of the original data heatmap, these are very similar; differing only by 0.02 in the lowest
temperature and equal in the highest. This reflects that an aggregation based on the original
data distribution reduces the impact on geospatial analysis more than when aggregating by
administrative boundaries; as it was the case for the experiments with NRand-K. Figure 5.20
shows the output for a heatmap done with obfuscated data using VoKA with 1km of distance
for KD-Aggregation. Here, the maximum temperature is of 12.8, decreasing by 0.5 from the
heatmap with the original data, and suggesting a greater impact than that of NRand-K with an
rmax of 1km.
The divergence heatmap of VoKA with an rmax = 500m shows the least alterations or highlights
when compared to the one of rmax = 1km as well as to all other evaluated scenarios. This is
better seen when comparing the mean heatmap error in Table 5.1, where the one for VoKA with
an rmax = 500m was 6.67, the smallest error of all tests.
As for the hotspot analysis in Figures 5.19 and 5.22, which resulted in identical outputs as the
one produced with the original dataset, proving the preservation of the hotspots identified with
the original tweets; as it was the case as well with NRand-K mechanism analysed in the previous
subsection.
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5.4 Comparison
In order to calculate the Spatial Indices, the original dataset was used to obtain values necessary
for these calculations. For the MDi described in Equation 5.1, the d(original mean, farthest point)
resulted in a value of 10,610m; for the ODi described in Equation 5.2, the SDE orientation an-
gle was 63.51◦. It is worth noting that all indices presented here are better if the resulting value
is close to zero. The following table shows the resulting values for each experimental scenario
described in the LPPM column, the euclidean distance for the means, the results for MDi, the
SDE orientation angle, the resulting ODi and the PCDi. The values in bold are the ones that










5.84 m 0.06 60.05◦ 1.93 67.74 12.04
Pinwheel
1km
13.65m 0.13 48.54◦ 8.32 102.86 31.3
NRand-K
500m
20.05m 0.19 53.76◦ 5.42 25.52 16.03
NRand-K
1km
18.07m 0.17 48.10◦ 8.56 31.81 20.73
NRand-K
500m





18.32m 0.17 54.77◦ 4.86 0 22.35
(polygon re-
striction)
VoKA 500m 88.06m 0.83 64.84◦ 0.74 18.68 6.67
VoKA 1km 246.4m 2.32 66.4◦ 3.53 59.56 17.33
Table 5.1: Comparison of spatial indices
From the results obtained by calculating the described indices, the VoKA mechanism is the one
that obtained the best results in most cases; it has the lowest orientation and point count diver-
gence; however it produced the highest value for the MDi. On the other hand, the mechanism
that produced a mean coordinate most similar to the original dataset was Pinwheel when an
rmax = 500 m was used, and its ODi value follows that of VoKA being the second lowest; indi-
cating less impact in the orientation of the data. The NRand-K mechanism performed averagely
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for the ODi when an rmax = 500m was used, but shows more similarities when the polygon
restriction is enforced, in this case the PCDi is 0, as expected.
5.5 Discussion
Spool (2011) states that the default configuration for an application will not be altered by most
users, making the definition of defaults critical for the future of a service. This consideration
should be a priority for deploying applications that include privacy protection policies, which
in LBS translates into finding the appropriate settings for LPPMs to work under essential and
practical scenarios. Assessing the impact of LPPMs on the quality of information can provide
an initial estimate on the best parameter values to reduce the degradation while guaranteeing a
minimum level of protection. These values could serve as default values that later on, the LBS
manager can adjust to a specific application, even for real-time LPPMs.
Figure 5.23: Obfuscated locations (blue dots) falling outside study boundaries
The results of these experiments to assess the geospatial analysis impact, highlight the impor-
tance of adjusting parameters for both obfuscation algorithms and analysis tools. The scale of
the study is critical to determine a feasible noise to induce; while 500m can work for perform-
ing geospatial analysis in a city, a noise of 5km can also perform well if the analysis area is in
the scale of a country. The results obtained here prove that if correctly parametrised, a privacy
preserving geospatial analysis can be done with similar outputs as if the data was unprotected.
It is worth noting that none of the presented algorithms introduce any knowledge of the ge-
ographical area of the study hence, being prompt to produce obfuscated locations falling in
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improbable areas as evidenced in Figure 5.23.
5.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents a methodology to compare different obfuscation LPPMs using different
spatial analysis and indices, the results conclude that geospatial analysis is still possible and




Since the emergence of location-aware devices, the offer of LBS should have been accompanied
by the mechanisms necessary to ensure privacy. The fact that it is only in recent years that we
have become aware 1 of this is due to unseen risks, from which we are now suffering.
LPPMs should evolve as LBS do. In order to create relevant protection mechanisms, the grow-
ing spectrum of LBS functionalities is a challenge for their implementation in commercial ap-
plications; companies may not be willing to experiment with privacy algorithms, at the risk of
losing accuracy or compromising data analysis, which is part of their business model. However,
as the user community become aware of the value of their privacy, this may become an incen-
tive for further research driven to commercial adoption of location privacy solutions; specially,
if accompanied by legal enforcement from governmental institutions or international organisa-
tions.
6.2 Geoprivacy Incidents
Xu and Gupta (2009) mention how user’s privacy concerns translate into the fear of losing con-
trol of personal information and can even lead to cause stress and anxiety. This is ameliorated by
the adoption of protective measures, the perception of privacy and users’ trust on the providing
companies of a service can increase, leading to more compliance to adopt a LBS.
The recent events of the Strava fitness application that unintentionally gave away the positions of
military bases reported in (Hern, 2018) and the Facebook incident documented in (Schechter,
1“having or showing realization, perception, or knowledge” from Merriam Webster (a).
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2018), that allowed Cambridge Analytica2 to manipulate the United States presidential elec-
tions, 2016, or as described in their slogan: “Data drives all we do. Cambridge Analytica uses
data to change audience behaviour.” are just some of the possibilities that the existence of geo-
referenced big data enable. Geographic information is not a dismissible component of big data
nowadays, it is key to conducting analysis; since data analysis missing context is unlikely to
provide informed results.
What is particular in the case of Facebook or any other platform that allow the introduction of
promoted unregulated information is their potential to not only gather data, but to process it
and feed it back to the user according to the user’s specific profile; while serving their clients
advertising interests. In this scenario, the user is off course accountable for voluntarily engaging
in the use of these services and for neglecting the exercise of informed judgement on topics of
her interests, but is there any real alternative other than to renounce the use of these platforms?
The ethical dilemma that this poses is not new. If unrestricted, companies will take as much
advantage of their resources to be profitable; machiavellian3. It is not their lawful duty to see
for the preservation of rights of individuals. It is the job of governmental institutions to regulate
supported by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), e.g., the United Nations.
6.3 Privacy Advocates
In the pursuit for finding privacy advocates in this era, two organisations stand out: the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF, 2016), based in the U.S and Privacy International (Privacy In-
ternational, a), based in the U.K. These organisations are established on the common principle
of defending individual’s rights in a digital world; Privacy International specifically focusing on
the right to privacy. Among the many activities and projects they support, engaging with NGO
is one of them. According to Privacy International (2017):
Engaging with the UN human rights mechanisms is not an end in itself: it serves
to develop common understanding of the scope of the right to privacy, spells out
the obligations of states to uphold the right, and the responsibilities of companies to
respect the right. Very often, recommendations by the UN serve national advocacy
strategy: the recommendations of these mechanisms can be fundamental to sup-
porting national campaign for changes in laws and practices. Additionally, some
UN bodies can offer a mechanism of redress for victims of violations and act as an
2cambridgeanalytica.org
3from Machiavellianism: “the political theory of Machiavelli; especially: the view that politics is amoral and
that any means however unscrupulous can justifiably be used in achieving political power” defined in (Merriam
Webster, b).
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international ‘watchdog’, by, for example, raising concerns of individuals at risk or
legislative proposals that could, if implemented, violate the right to privacy.
Privacy advocates can raise awareness, but it is a long way for regulations to be in place given
that ultimately, each country is in charged of their jurisdiction. However:
Data isn’t stopping at the borders and our rights and protections shouldn’t either.
Companies are using countries with low protections as testing ground for worst
practices.
Privacy International (b)
This thesis argues that it is a matter of international laws to regulate privacy on digital services,
since service providers may take advantage of poor privacy regulations in specific countries to
exploit data that originates anywhere. If the situation is already challenging in areas with clear
privacy regulations, what about those without minimum privacy guidelines or non-existent?
6.4 Towards Ethical Geodata Management
The implementation of a regulatory measure for location privacy may happen in the near future,
at least by political unions like the European Union where reports like the one presented in
(Winterbottom et al., 2009) attempt to provide clear standards for geoprivacy and that in general,
the EU is more protective of the user’s privacy rights when compared to other states. Under this
scenario, it is critical to understand the impact that regulatory measures for geoprivacy may have
on deospatial analysis. This thesis assesses geospatial analysis with different location privacy
protection mechanisms to provide a baseline of what it might be like in a future with an ethical
geodata management.
The complexity of the situation given the diverse actors and interests involved, begs at least the
following question: When does CGI data becomes usable in the way VGI data would?
Which is quickly followed by: What are the limits of VGI data usability, if any?
This thesis takes the view that we are all stakeholders in this matter; service providers do have
a great moral responsibility. A responsibility that should perhaps be decentralised; if an open
data approach is carried out, considering releasing data with implemented privacy protection
mechanisms accessible to not only a few, but to everyone; the relation between LBS providers
and users could become symbiotic. In this way, users would not only be generators of the prod-
uct, but benefit from it; avoiding the need of recurring to specialised companies with privileged
access to this data, which in most cases is not accessible to laymen.
While this research is of a technical nature with ethical implications, such implications are out
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of the scope of this work and it stands an open discussion. However if taking an ethical stand-
point, this work is more inclined towards Kant’s Categorical Imperative4, than a machiavellian
approach; in this regard, service providers should not only wish for their own well-being and
happiness, but consider their yet unregulated actions as becoming a universal law and their
consequences.
A popular argument that pro-surveillance organisations present is the fact that if someone has
nothing to hide, then privacy should not be a concern. On the contrary, universal rights exist for
everyone regardless of their conditions or in other words:
“The main problem with the nothing to hide argument is assuming that privacy
is important only if you have something to hide,” said Ignacio Cofone, a New York
University research fellow and privacy expert. “Privacy is portrayed, then, as some-
thing for deviants. If we start arguing how everyone has something to hide, then
we’ve already lost.” Harding (2018)
This chapter draws together the case studies and LPPMs examined in the previous chapters to
answer the research question of this thesis: How to provide location privacy with mecha-
nisms that are scalable, efficient, non-intrusive and with low impact on geospatial analy-
sis?.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 were dedicated to describe the implementation of proposed LPPMs that
comply with being scalable, efficient, non-intrusive and how these can be adopted by service
providers, while Chapter 5 describe how it will reflect on service providers geodata management
model in respect to having a low impact on geospatial analysis.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter finalises the discussion of the concepts and the technical work that this thesis
has undertaken. Taking a view on further ethical implications that are up to discussion. The
proceeding chapter concludes this thesis.
4“act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal




This thesis examined geoprivacy; the existing techniques and proposed new mechanisms con-
sidering a balance between privacy protection and realistic interest of LBS providers. In doing
so, two stages for geodata protection were identified: While the LBS is being used and after the
LBS collected the data from its users. This chapter concludes the thesis, examining the research
questions, aims and objectives and how they were achieved. Further it discusses the limitations
of this research, sets a future research agenda and closes this thesis.
7.2 Meeting the Research Questions, Aims and Objectives
Chapter 1 introduced the research question, aims and objectives of investigating location pri-
vacy, its applications and implications. This necessitated an approach to first examine the ex-
isting mechanisms in the literature, then to demarcate a canon for what geoprivacy protection
mechanisms should do and then to design such mechanisms. Going further, in order to prove
that the developed mechanisms comply with the research question, a replicable process involv-
ing geospatial analysis was presented as a model to quantify the impact of such protection
mechanisms. The following subsections examine how the research questions, aims and objec-
tives were met in the context of this research.
7.2.1 Identifying Common Characteristics of LPPMs
LPPMs aim to protect users geographic information from LBS or from third parties. In order
to do so, the different existing techniques in the literature were categorised under three types
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according to the type of LBS they can serve, i.e., reactive, proactive or both. This classifica-
tion allowed to understand the characteristics of the numerous mechanisms that may use one
or more of these techniques to achieve location privacy; with variations in their approaches and
their specific applications. The characteristics identified served to compare between the sur-
veyed mechanisms and establish a canon to develop geoprivacy algorithms that were feasible to
implement in existing LBS.
The identified characteristics that an ideal LPPM should comply with were identified as foolows:
serve for all types of LBS, provide as much privacy as possible (the entire spatial domain),
while not requiring the use of a third party, and that does not alter the existing LBS architecture.
These ideal characteristics are hard to meet, but some trade-offs are acceptable: a mechanism
that does not alter the LBS but that provides adjustable privacy protection in a decentralised
way and without including a third party is the viable option. From here on, the thesis focused
mainly on location obfuscation algorithms that proved to meet these requirements in both Table
2.1 of Chapter 2 and Table 3.1 of Chapter 3.
7.2.2 Developing Scalable, efficient & non-intrusive LPPMs
After identifying that the ideal but feasible characteristics to provide to an LPPM are possible
with the use of the location obfuscation technique, privacy protection mechanisms based on
this technique were developed for their implementation during real-time use of an LBS. The
presented mechanisms for real-time use (θ -Rand, Pinwheel & Near-Rand) are scalable in the
way that the maximum noise threshold is possible to fix according to the necessity of the service;
efficient, because the computational cost for θ -Rand and Pinwheel is constant O(1), and for
Near-Rand is linear O(n), not taking more than milliseconds to process in a mobile device; and
non-intrusive, since none of these mechanisms require alterations in the LBS to enable their
functionality.
7.2.3 Minimising Geospatial Analysis Impact
By analysing the behaviour of the outputs in geospatial analysis with location obfuscation tech-
niques before and after collection, it was identified that aggregation based on the original data
distribution reduces the impact on geospatial analysis. Mechanisms like NRand-K and VoKA
are a contribution in this aspect, and are not necessarily only applicable after the collection
has occurred; if enough historical geographic information is considered, the aggregation can be
performed according to those historical records while the LBS is being used.
7.3. Suggested Further Research 99
7.3 Suggested Further Research
This research has illuminated the need to consider not only LBS functionalities, but geodata us-
ability for analysis when developing geoprivacy techniques. There are other aspects to geospa-
tial analysis that this thesis does not cover, such as semantic analysis for contextual information
and other implications that alterations in geographic information may have in the LBS agenda.
It is encouraged to follow up the developments of geoprivacy violation issues, regulations, and
the pertinency of storing reported locations for unlimited time.
7.4 Final Conclusions
The conclusion of this thesis is that performing reverse engineering in algorithms for geospatial
analysis, provides a common ground for understanding how these analyses can be affected by
alterations in geographic information. This understanding leads to the creation of mechanisms
that leverage users and geodata stakeholders interests to engage in privacy protective measures
without risking the possibility of performing geospatial analysis.
Arguably, this is the first study of LPPMs of this depth combining the interests of both users
for privacy protection and LBS providers for geodata re-usability. Demonstrably, this thesis is
very timely due to numerous recent outrages that digital privacy violations imply. Even though
the geo component is just one dimension of digital privacy, it is of great importance in any data
analysis; for without context, the analysis would lack relevance.
While the problem of risking location privacy was foreseen by the academic community since
the emergence of LBS, it is now that by ignoring this, the consequences are evidenced in a
catastrophic manner. It is not hopeless; however to think that location privacy mechanisms will
be in place for the continuity of massive adoption of LBS.
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